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On a summer day in 1979, Washington fluttered with green ban-
ners, each embellishing a stately old structure and proclaiming its
bearer to exemplify the city's "Buildings Reborn. . . New Uses, Old
Places." At the same time, the Smithsonian's Renwick Gallery was
sponsoring a photography exhibit extolling the "adaptive reuse" of
old buildings; the American Institute of Architects' Octagon House
(itself a recycled eighteenth-century residence) housed "Capital
Losses," a photographic exhibit of the city's demolished or
threatened old landmark buildings; and renovations were underway
in the cavernous interior of the Pension Building, another reclaimed
architectural relic. Such a day in the nation's capital reflects an in-
terest that has sprung up in cities all over the country: Preservation
of old structures has become a vogue.
The volume of preservationist statutes, grant programs, regula-
tions, and lawsuits over the past few years attests the major role of
federal, state, and local governments in contributing to historic pres-
ervation's new stature. With the arrival of budget cutters in Wash-
ington, however, the preservationist flags may soon come down;
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sharp questioning of federal involvement in preservation has already
begun.' The potential retrenchment in Washington pointedly raises
the question whether current programs serve the public well-being.
Why should our public institutions take an interest in preserving the
nation's architectural heritage?
Until the recent past that interest was slight. The initial confron-
tation with a new continent required flexibility and openness to nov-
elty rather than attention to tradition,2 and the nation was long
preoccupied with expansion and development. Consequently, Amer-
ican governments at all levels were slow to attend to the conservation
of historic architecture.3 Before the turn of the century, state and
local governments gave only lukewarm support to the few private
preservation efforts.4 Federal support was almost nonexistent then,
and very modest for decades thereafter. It consisted chiefly of the
acquisition of a few individual park sites5 and "landmarks" of na-
tional significance; 6 the protection of "antiquities" on federal prop-
erty;7 a Depression-era survey of historically and architecturally
significant structures;8 the founding of a nonprofit "National Trust"
to encourage private preservation; 9 and the creation of an historic
1. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1981, at 14, col. 2 (western ed.) (proposed cuts in federal
assistance to cultural programs); i at 9, col. 6 (proposed cuts in the Interior Department's
parks and recreation programs). Interior Secretary James Watt has abolished the Heritage
Conservation and Recreation Service, which administered several federal preservation pro-
grams. See S.F. Chronicle, Feb. 20, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
2. See B. BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 22 (1960).
3. See J. MORRISON, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAw 4, 11, 16 (2d ed. 1965). Morrison
noted this country's slow start in preservation as well as the great increase in preservation
measures between 1957 and 1965.
4. See C. HOSMER, THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST 29-62 (1965). For a more recent brief
history of historic preservation, see N. WEINBERG, HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN AMERICAN
TOWNS AND CITIES 20-27 (1979).
5. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 27, 1894, ch. 12, 28 Stat. 597 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 430f
(1976)) (establishing Shiloh National Military Park); Act of Mar. 2, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-409,
47 Stat. 1421 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 409 (1976)) (establishing Morristown Historical
Park).
6. Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act of 1935, §§ 1-7, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467
(1976). Historic landmark designation of private property under this act actually began in
1960. G. GAMMAcE, P. JONES & S. JONES, HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN CALIFORNIA 22
(1975).
7. Act of June 8, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-209, 34 Stat. 225 (current version at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 431-433 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
8. The Historic American Buildings Survey was created in 1933 without specific statu-
tory authorization as a program of the National Parks Service. See Peterson, Thiry Years of
HABS, AM. INST. ARCHITECTS J., Nov. 1963, at 83.
9. Act of Oct. 26, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-408, 63 Stat. 927 (current version at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 468-468d (1976)) (establishing the National Trust for Historic Preservation).
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district in Washington's Georgetown."° During the 1950s, federal,
state, and local governments embarked on urban renewal and high-
way projects that chewed up aging neighborhoods and distinctive old
buildings, leading one commentator to remark that there "appear to
be good reasons why preservation-minded individuals and groups
often regard the government .. .as the major enemy."'"
But in the last 15 years the situation has changed dramatically.
In the mid-1960s federal legislation initiated surveys for a National
Register of Historic Places and, to protect those historic places, im-
posed elaborate review-and-comment procedures on federally as-
sisted projects. Since that time, federal grants have encouraged states
to participate in surveys and conservation of historic properties,' 2
and federal tax laws have been changed to induce private preserva-
tion and rehabilitation of historic properties.' 3 The states have re-
sponded with expanded preservation programs;' 4 many have altered
common law rules that once inhibited the creation and enforcement
of preservation easements or covenants and have enacted enabling
legislation for local preservation controls, t5 resulting in local preser-
vation of both individual historic landmarks and entire historic dis-
tricts. 
6
Historic preservation, the erstwhile preserve of patriotic organiza-
tions and academic architecture buffs, now attracts the interest of
local governments seeking to stave off suburban flight, 17 neighbor-
10. Act of Sept. 22, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-808, 64 Stat. 903 (current version at D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-801 to -807 (1973)).
11. Jacobs, Governmental Expeience in the United States, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION To-
DAY 104 (1966) (Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation seminar).
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976), as amended by National Historic Preservation Act
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987.
13. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 38, 48(g), 167(o), 191, 280B.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 269, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6, reprinted in [1973] 1 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1548, 1553-54. For a compilation of these and other state legislative
efforts in historic preservation, see National Trust for Historic Preservation, Significant State
Historic Preservation Statutes (1979) (Information Sheet No. 21) [hereinafter cited as Signifi-
cant State Statutes].
15. See Brenneman, Historic Preservation Restrictions: A Sampling of State Statutes, 8 CONN.
L. REV. 231 (1976); Brenneman, Techniquesfor Controlling the Surroundings of Hisoric Sites, 36
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 416, 420-22 (1971); Note, Conservation Restrictions: A Survey, 8 CONN.
L. REV. 383 (1976); see note 102 injfa.
16. The complex "transfer of development rights" schemes for the preservation of
landmark buildings are examples of innovative legislation in this area. See J. COSTONIS,
SPACE ADRIFT (1974); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Costonis,
The Chicago Pla" Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmrks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574
(1972); note 115 hjfra.
17. See Galbreath, Consrevationt, The New Word/or Old Neighborhoods, 8 CONN. L. REV.
312 (1976).
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hood organizations hoping to save their streets from various govern-
mental and developmental bulldozers,"8 businessmen in quest of a
combination of tax advantages and public relations,' 9 and environ-
mentalists buying time against dams and highways.2" In short, there
seems to be something for everyone in historic preservation.
That is just the difficulty: The phrase "historic preservation" is so
elastic that any sort of project can be justified-or any change vili-
fied-in its name. In a sense, every event is "history," and it is a
cliche among professional historians that views of "historic signifi-
cance" alter considerably with shifting social interests-a point am-
ply attested by the sudden discovery of black history, the boom in the
history of women's movements, and the reinterpretation of the Cold
War.2" Art and architectural historians, especially important to pres-
ervation, are equally flexible in their views of "historic significance,"
as shown by their recent interest in the art deco Coca-Cola signs,
quonset hut offices, and White Tower diners that once horrified his-
toric preservationists. 2
Like "historic significance," "preservation" is a varying concept.
Does "preservation" mean maintenance, or restoration, or indeed re-
construction and adaptive alteration?23 Is it merely photographing
18. See, e.g., WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1979).
19. See R. WARNER, S. GROFF & R.P. WARNER, BUSINESS AND PRESERVATION (1978).
T. Bever, Economics of Historic Preservation 4 (May 1978) (Heritage Conservation and Rec-
reation Serv. report), notes savings in construction costs and time as benefits of the rehabilita-
tion of older buildings.
20. See Environmental Defense Fund v. T.V.A., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973),
af'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). This type of litigation tends to center on preservation of
archaeologically significant sites. See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Brinegar, 389 F. Supp. 1102 (D.
Hawaii 1974), reo'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976).
21. Cf R. HOFSTADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS 442-44 (1968) (comments on
recent historiography). See also D. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES (1970); Becker, Detach-
ment and the Writing ofHistor,, in DETACHMENT AND THE WRITING OF HISTORY 3 (P. Snyder
ed. 1958). Preservation programs also reflect changes of opinion in the matters that are "his-
torically significant." The National Park Service's National Historic Landmarks program,
for example, has in recent years expanded its criteria to include sites significant in Afro-
American and women's history. See C. GREIFF, THE HISTORIC PROPERTY OWNER'S MAN-
UAL B-2 (1977). Federal matching grants for state preservation projects are being directed in
part to projects that preserve areas associated with minority or ethnic history. See S2 Million
Available to Statefor Hisloric Preservation Grants, [1979] 7 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 636.
22. See Bulkley, To Preserve or Not? That is the Question for a Neo-Neon Age, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 4. See generally R. VENTURI, D. BROWN & S. IZENOUR, LEARNING
FROM LAS VEGAS (1972).
23. British law distinguishes "preservation" from "conservation"; the latter includes
adaptive modern modification of older buildings, although in such a way as to "consort with"
earlier styles. See PRESERVATION POLICY GROUP OF THE MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT TO THE MINISTER 4-5 (1970).
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old things or describing them in words? Does it include something
new that further develops an older tradition?24 Because historic sig-
nificance is so open-ended and preservation so ambiguous, publicly
supported historic preservation is singularly vulnerable to the charge
of arbitrariness.
This is no matter of merely academic significance. Despite a cer-
tain little-old-lady aura about preservation in the abstract,25 disputes
over preservation can carry an extraordinary emotional force: Wit-
ness the Hawaiians who risked criminal trespass charges to prevent
the armed services' practice bombing on ancient Indian shrines.
26
Money stakes also run high. In 1978, lease arrangements worth mil-
lions of dollars were lost when the United States Supreme Court de-
cided in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 27 that New York's
preservation controls on Grand Central Station did not amount to a
"taking" and that the owners could thus be prevented from adding a
multi-story tower to the old building. 8 As the courts begin to inter-
pret the wave of preservation statutes, some property owners are re-
sisting landmark designation under the statutes. Once viewed as a
merely honorary embellishment, designation is now fraught with tax
consequences and use restrictions.
29
24. A recent case in Cape Cod provides an interesting example of several of these
problems. Sleeper v. Old King's Highway Regional Historic Dist., No. 22,799 (Mass. Dist.
Ct., Mar. 6, 1978), afd sub noma. Sleeper v. Bourne, No. 216 (Mass. App., Jan. 10, 1980). A
would-be builder of a 68-foot radio tower noted that Cape Cod had been a center of early
broadcasting experiments, id at 4, and argued that his proposed tower was in keeping with
this historic tradition. The local historic district board thought it more important to retain an
uncluttered view of some indicia of old Indian and Colonial tales, id. at 4-5, and therefore
denied his permit application. The court supported the board. Id at 19. It is not altogether
clear that Sleeper's version of Cape Cod's history is less compelling than that of the district
board; nor is it altogether clear that his plan for a new structure was less preservative of a
certain continuity with the past.
25. Modem preservationists appear to be somewhat defensive about any attribution of
preservation to "little old ladies." See Edmisten, Marshalling Preservation Law Resources, 12
URB. LAW. 3, 42 (1980).
26. United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978);
cf. Aluli v. Brown, 437 F. Supp. 602 (D. Hawaii 1977), reo'd, 602 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1979)
(separate civil action to enjoin bombing pending preservation review).
27. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
28. Id at 138. For the interesting comments of the New York Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 50 A.D.2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20
(1975), ajJ'd, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), afd, 438 U.S. 104
(1978).
29. See HERITAGE CONSERVATION & RECREATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTE-
RIOR, FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS TO ENCOURAGE REHABILITATION OF HISTORIC BUILD-
INGS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THEIR EFFECTS 19 (1979); Aroad Range of Witnesses Object to Historic
Preseration Tax Disincentives, [1978] 6 Hous. & Dav. REP. (BNA) 717 (comments of Clark J.
Strickland, Connecticut state historic preservation officer). The tax consequences of National
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Aside from direct financial considerations, historic preservation
activities may have consequences that give pause to the most socially
conscious citizen: A preservation board's permit denial may block
nursing home facilities,30 a low-income housing project, 31 or a rapid
transit facility;32 and, perhaps most significant, in the wake of in-
creased attention to historic structures, the low-income residents of
old neighborhoods may be forced out by steeply rising rents.
The displacement of low-income residents, to which I shall return
later,33 may be the albatross of the modern historic preservation
movement, evoking as it does the overtones of snobbery and special
interest that have long dogged preservationists. 4 Almost a decade
ago, Michael Newsome warned that poor black families might be
displaced as middle class whites moved into spruced-up "historic"
neighborhoods-and observed that it wasn't black history that the
preservationists had in mind.
3 5
The displacement issue raises the central problems in historic
preservation law: What elements of the past are to be preserved, and
why should their preservation take the form of maintaining buildings
or groups of buildings? The answers clearly entail choices among
political constituencies and preferences. But without a coherent ra-
tionale to explain and direct public involvement in preservation ac-
tivities, the legal techniques for preservation become little more than
Register designation were central to the new provisions for owner consent to National Regis-
ter designation, National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515,
sec. 201(a), § 101(a)(6), 94 Stat. 2987 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(6)). See note 118
infia .
30. Geriatric Care, Inc. v. Capitol Zoning Dist. Comm'n, No. 78-3952 (Pulaski County
Cir. Ct., Ark., filed July 21, 1978), reported in [Sept. 1978] National Trust for Historic Preser-
vation, Historic Preservation Litigation Chart 1 [hereinafter cited as Litigation Chart]; Ran-
gel v. Association Residence Nursing Homes, Inc., Civ. No. 75-1540 (S.D.N.Y., filed March
1975), reported in [Sept. 1975] Litigation Chart, supra, at 12 (Later Developments).
31. La Comisi6n Central de Cuidadanos de Alcalde v. Harris, Civ. No. 77-386P
(D.N.M., filed July 6, 1977), reported in [Oct. 1977] Litigation Chart, supira note 30, at 12.
32. See, e.g., Inman Park Restoration, Inc. v. Urban Mass Transp. Admin., 414 F. Supp.
99, 121 (N.D. Ga. 1976), a fdsub nom. Save Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978).
33. See notes 180-202 infia and accompanying text.
34. Cf C. HOSMER, supra note 4, at 139 (early preservationists' sensitivity to charges of
aristocratic tendencies in their organizations); R. NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN
MIND 169 (2d ed. 1973) (long-standing criticism of nature conservationists on similar
grounds).
35. See Newsome, Blacks and Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 423,
423-24 (1971); accord, Riley, Annapolis: White Sails in the Sunset, Wash. Post, June 3, 1979,
Magazine, at 14; Pasadena Commission Helps Renewal Eforts, Landmark & Historic Dist. Com-
missions, Aug. 1979, at 3, col. 1, and at 4, col. I (Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation newslet-
ter).
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new weapons for the politically adroit. Precisely because preserva-
tion calls for political choices, it is imperative to identify the public
purposes of preservation so that preservation law can be made intelli-
gible by reference to those purposes.
Can any coherent rationale give shape to the amorphous activi-
ties that might conceivably gather under the aegis of historic preser-
vation? Just such a rationale has been emerging in the recent
profusion of preservation programs-a rationale slightly unexpected
and seldom fully articulated, yet repeatedly glimpsed in the major
preservationist legislation and litigation over the last 15 years. Ac-
cording to this implicit rationale, the chief function of preservation is
to strengthen local community ties and community organization.
The very inchoacy of the community-building purpose in preser-
vation-not to speak of the many preservation activities that seem to
diverge from such a purpose-suggests that this emerging rationale
requires exploration and elaboration. This article undertakes that
task, first crystallizing the main features of a community-building ra-
tionale for preservation, and then using the rationale as a standard
for evaluating current preservation programs.
Since a community-building rationale grows out of preservation
views of the past, the article begins in Part I with a discussion of
those past views, stressing the aspects that have been incorporated
into the new direction in preservation law. Part II of the article ex-
amines current preservation goals and the legal procedures for reach-
ing those goals, in relation to a community-building rationale. The
article concludes that historic preservation is important for maintain-
ing the physical environment necessary for an urban community, but
it can be even more important in providing procedural vehicles for
community organization and activity.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF A COMMUNITY-BUILDING
PRESERVATION RATIONALE
The history of historic preservation is commonly thought to re-
flect the emergence of three dominant perspectives.36 The first of
these, especially characteristic of the nineteenth century, is the idea
that historic preservation should seek to inspire the observer with a
sense of patriotism. Thus, nineteenth-century preservation activities
revolved around structures associated with famous individuals or
36. A good summary of the shifts in these objectives appears in Schatzel, Public Historic
Presevation in Texas, 49 TEx. L. REV. 267, 268-77 (1971). Se generally Hosmer, Pivate Philan-
thropy and Preservation , in HISTORIC PRESERVATION TODAY, sufira note 11, at 150.
February 1981]
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events; the movement to save Mount Vernon is perhaps the epitome
of this approach.37 The second theme has a cultural, artistic, and
architectural focus, emerging at about the turn of the century with
the entry of professional artists and architects into historic preserva-
tion. The protagonists of this view thought preservation activities
should focus on the artistic merit of buildings or groups of buildings
and on the integrity of their architectural style.38 In recent years a
third strand has appeared that incorporates some elements of the ear-
lier two. Its most notable characteristic is a concern for the environ-
mental and psychological effects of historic preservation. Indeed, this
approach to preservation coincided with the environmental move-
ment, and like that movement centers on the relationship of human
beings to their physical surroundings. It stresses the "sense of
place" 39 that older structures lend to a community, giving individu-
als interest, orientation, and a sense of familiarity in their surround-
ings.
40
All three themes, or elements of them, now .appear in current cri-
teria for the National Register of Historic Places--criteria that (to-
gether with the earlier and similar National Landmarks program
criteria) embody whatever nationwide agreement we have about
what aspects of the past should be preserved.4' Moreover, each
37. See C. HOSMER, sufra note 4, at 41-62; J. MORRISON, supra note 3, at 2-3. Inspira-
tion may still be the most commonly accepted rationale for historic preservation; certainly it
was reflected in the major piece of federal preservation legislation prior to the mid-60s: the
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1976). The
preamble to this statute stated that historic structures were to be preserved "for the inspira-
tion and benefit of the people of the United States." Id § 461.
38. Such early American protagonists of this view as Andrew Green and William Sum-
ner Appleton were apparently influenced by European preservationist thinkers, notably Mor-
ris and Ruskin. See C. HOSMER, supra note 4, at 93-95, 238, 255-57. See generally J.
MORRISON, supra note 3. There is arguably an inspirational aspect to this branch of preserva-
tion as well, since art too may be viewed as inspiring the viewer.
39. See text accompanying note 83 infia.
40. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t, as amended
by National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat.
2987, picks up this thread, specifically stating as a purpose of the Act that "the historical and
cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living part of our communily 1ife
and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people." Id
§ 470(b)(2). This orientation motif may characterize some earlier preservation activities as
well, such as the efforts of ethnic groups, religious organizations, and families to mark out
their own historic contributions. See C. HOSMER, supra note 4, at 267-68.
41. For the National Register criteria, see 36 C.F.R. § 1202.6 (1980):
"The quality of significance in American history, architecture, archeology, and culture is
present in districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects of State and local importance that
possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association,
and
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theme bears a direct relationship to a government interest often cited
to justify government involvement in preservation.42 Civic education
supports the inspirational view, promoting tourism fits comfortably
with the protection of representative or meritorious structures, and
the interest in revitalizing city areas to render them stable, useful,
and prosperous for current and future residents accompanies the
maintenance of a community's sense of place.
Exploration of the "civic education" entailed in the early, inspira-
tional phase of historic preservation suggests, however, that public
purposes of preservation are somewhat deeper, and perhaps more
closely related, than this merely additive listing implies.
A. The Nineteenth Centug: Preservation as "Inspiration"
The nineteenth-century inspirational view of preservation was
marked by an interest in civic education intended from the outset to
have important political ramifications.' This was true even of pri-
(a) That are associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad
patterns of our history; or
(b) That are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or
(c) That embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction,
or that represent the work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that represent a
significant and distinguishable entity whose components may lack individual distinction; or
(d) That have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in prehistory or
history."
For the most recent version of the National Landmarks criteria, see the interim regula-
tions at 44 Fed. Reg. 74,826 (1979). The previous criteria were informally developed and
published in pamphlets. See G. GAMMAGE, P. JONES & S. JONES, supra note 6, at 106. But see
Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839 (E.D. Va. 1980) (strongly criticiz-
ing the Interior Department's failure to issue final regulations, holding National Historic
Landmark designation a violation of the 5th amendment and the Administrative Procedure
Act, and ordering the Secretary to promulgate substantive standards).
There is widespread reliance on the two sets of criteria. The Advisory Council on His-
toric Preservation has suggested that states adopt the National Register criteria for their own
programs. Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Guidelines for State Historic Preserva-
tion Legislation 6, 11 (Mar. 1972), reprinted in Proposed Extension and Expansion of the National
Historic Preservation Program: Hearing on Hi 5743 and HR. 7127 Before the Subcomm. on National
Parks and Recreation of the Comm on Interior and Insular Afairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 39, 44 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Guidelines]. Many local ordinances also have criteria based on the Na-
tional Register or National Landmarks criteria, with modifications of the latter to include
structures or areas of local significance. See, e.g., PARK CITY, UTAH, CODE § 2.4 (1976); Seat-
tle, Wash., Ordinance 98852, § 4 (April 7, 1970) (Pioneer Square Historic Dist.); Wichita,
Kan., Ordinance 33-790 (Apr. 1, 1975) (amending WICHITA, KAN., CODE § 2.12.1019).
42. For a summary of these stated public purposes, see Williams, Subjectivity, Expression
and ,rivacy: Problems of Aesthetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-36 (1977).
43. Cf Mosse, Comment, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION TODAY, supra note 11, at 38-42
(discussing the motivations of the contemporaneous European preservation movement and its
political implications, and arguing that a concern for medieval structures was the preserva-
HeinOnline -- 33 Stan. L. Rev. 481 1980-1981
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
vate preservation activities. In the mid-nineteenth century, Edward
Everett undertook fundraising lectures to support the preservation of
Mount Vernon, apparently with the hope that this symbol of a na-
tional hero might narrow the growing abyss between North and
South.' A few years later, the women's groups of New York hoped
that their preservation efforts would help to root a burgeoning immi-
grant population in American life and heritage.45
Embodied in these private activities was the idea that reminders
of a common past can link us together in a national community.
Government support for preservation, meager though it was in the
nineteenth century, relied on this rationale as stated in one of the few
preservation cases from the era, United States v. Gettysburg Electric Rail-
way Co.4 The United States wished to condemn property for the
creation of a national battlefield memorial at Gettysburg, and the
question arose whether the condemnation was for a "public pur-
pose." Justice Peckham's impassioned language was written within
the memory of an internecine war that had jolted the nation as no
other event in our history.
Upon the question whether the proposed use of this land is a
public one, we think there can be no well founded doubt.
... The battle of Gettysburg was one of the great battles of the
world. . . . The existence of the government itself and the
perpetuity of our institutions depended upon the result. . . . Such
a use seems necessarily not only a public use, but one so closely
connected with the welfare of the republic itself as to be within the
powers granted Congress by the Constitution for the purpose of
protecting and preserving the whole country. It would be a great
object lesson to all who looked upon the land thus cared for, and it
would show a proper recognition of the great things that were done
there on those momentous days. By this use the government
manifests for the benefit of all its citizens the value put upon the
services and exertions of the citizen soldiers of that period. Their
successful effort to preserve the integrity and solidarity of the great
republic of modern times is forcibly impressed upon every one who
looks over the field. The value of the sacrifices then freely made is
rendered plainer and more durable by the fact that the government
of the United States, through its representatives in Congress assem-
tionist expression of the nineteenth-century European Right's growing nationalism and antip-
athy to industrialization).
44. C. HOSMER, supra note 4, at 47-48.
45. Id at 138. The author quotes the 1900 report of the New York chapter of the
Colonial Dames of America: "'Americanizing of the children, enlisting their interest in his-
torical sites and characters has a great significance to every thinking mind-the making of
good citizens of these foreign youths.' " Id
46. 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
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bled, appreciates and endeavors to perpetuate it by this most suita-
ble recognition. Such action on the part of Congress touches the
heart, and comes home to the imagination of every citizen, and
greatly tends to enhance his love and respect for those institutions
for which these heroic sacrifices were made. . . . The institutions
of our country which were saved at this enormous expenditure of
life and property ought to and will be regarded with proportionate
affection. Here upon this battlefield is one of the proofs of that
expenditure, and the sacrifices are rendered more obvious and
more easily appreciated when such a battlefield is preserved by the
government at the public expense. 7
This extended passage strikingly illustrates two elements of con-
tinuing and critical importance in historic preservation law. The
first is the idea that preservation can in fact have the political pur-
pose of fostering a sense of community. The second element, though
less obvious, is equally important: It is the understanding that aplace
can convey this sense of commuhity, or more generally, that visual
surroundings work a political effect on our consciousness.
48
47. Id at 680-83.
48. The idea that physical surroundings affect the human psyche may lie at the base of
the widely drawn analogy between environmental concerns and historic preservation. Orga-
nizationally, early twentieth-century historic preservation efforts were joined to a concern for
the natural environment, as in the American Scenic and Historic Preservation Society. This
conjuncture has persisted through this century, for example in the jurisdiction of parks de-
partments over historic sites and, more recently, in the Interior Department's proposal to
create a combined registry of natural areas and historic areas. See HERITAGE CONSERVATION
& RECREATION SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, THE NATIONAL HERITAGE POLICY
ACT 17 (1979); National Heritage Trust Task Force, Phase III Report (draft, Sept. 8, 1977).
Today, one often hears preservationists speak of the "built environment," a phrase that seems
to encapsulate the linkage of environmentalist and preservationist concerns. See, e.g., ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR & INSULAR AF-
FAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESs., THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION PROGRAM TODAY
2-3 (Comm. Print 1976).
Despite the persistent joining of these subjects, a recent article denies that landmark
preservation can be justified by analogy to the preservation of nature. Golding & Golding,
Why Presene Landmarks? A Pre/iminag Inquigr, in K GOODPASTER & K. SAYRE, ETHICS AND
PROBLEMS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 175, 180-85 (1979). The authors may reach
this conclusion, however, only because they take a narrow view of the potential justifications
for natural preservation, discussing only the arguments relating to the "rights" of animals and
natural objects. Such "rights" analogies are difficult to apply to the historic preservation of
structures. But a justification of environmental protection may also derive from the perspec-
tive of human needs and goals and of the desirable effects that the natural surroundings may
have on the human psyche. Environmental policy arguments of this sort-which do seem to
have been common in the history of environmentalism, see, e.g., R. NASH, supra note 34, at
141-60, 262-63--could share more common ground with historic preservationist arguments,
a point that Golding and Golding appear to acknowledge at the end of their article. Golding
& Golding, supra, at 188.
Natural and historic preservation program goals may also diverge. For example, in the
Adirondack area of New York State, the elaborate summer retreats of nineteenth-century
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Gettysburg may seem the easy case, dealing as it did with an event
so emotionally charged for the later nineteenth-century public, and
with a statute so easily framed in the language of a trust among gen-
erations.49 But as preservationist efforts moved into a second phase-
preservation for the sake of architectural merit, without reference to
particular events or heroes-the legal discussion of public measures
for preservation drew back from any consideration at all of the politi-
cal concerns so clear in Gettysburg.
B. The Second Phase. Preservation for Architectural Merit
With the shift in interest to architectural merit, public involve-
ment took the form of architectural controls designed to protect a few
well-known old districts in such places as Charleston and New Orle-
ans.50 Challenges to these controls gave courts an opportunity for
reasoned articulation of the purposes of preservation. But even
though judicial opinions have generally upheld architectural con-
trols,5 analysis has not often strayed beyond the sterile confines of
conclusory homilies about the validity (or invalidity) of "aesthetic"
regulation, distinguishing preservation from "mere aesthetics" only
by reference to a vague rationale of education or, somewhat later, to
the promotion of tourism.
52
millionaires are now threatened by wilderness legislation. See Compromise with Nature, His-
TORIC PRESERVATION, Sept.-Oct. 1979, at 13.
49. For the trusteeship argument in the context of historic preservation, see note 128
in/Ja.
50. See notes 136-53 iJzra and accompanying text.
51. E.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); City of New Orle-
ans v. Pregament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198
La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d
557 (1955); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964);see F.
BOSSELMAN, THE TAKING ISSUE 182-94 (1973); Hershman, Beauty as the Subject of Legislative
Control, PRAc. LAw., Feb. 1969, at 20, 28-3 1; Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the
Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 732 n.243 (1963) (listing cases). Even
commentators who are cool to architectural regulation generally, on first amendment or re-
lated grounds, seem to make an exception when these regulations serve historic preservation.
See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, BILLBOARDS, GLASS HousES AND THE LAw (1977); Note, Aesthetic
Control of Land Use. A House Build Upon Sand, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 372, 390-91 (1964); Note,
Architectural Expression: Police Power and the First Amendaent, 16 URB. L. ANN. 273, 287 (1979).
For some explanation of this greater tolerance for "aesthetics" in the historic preservation
context, see note 52 in/a.
52. See J. MORRISON, supra note 3, at 20-34. It is noteworthy that Morrison's discussion
of historic preservation cases focuses on the dreary progression of "aesthetics" cases. How-
ever, historic preservation cases seem to have been able to escape the condemnation of "mere
aesthetics" for two reasons: (1) The historic preservation cases usually involve some argument
for promotion of education and the tourist trade, and thus do not rest solely on "merely
aesthetic" considerations. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 779,
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It is particularly ironic that judicial discussion lost its political
starch as preservation efforts turned to architectural merit, since ar-
chitects, of all the artists, have been least bashful about their own
political significance and have continually taken the view, implicit in
Gettysburg, that physical surroundings work a moral or political ef-
fect. 3 In earlier times, the Parisian architects of the French Revolu-
tion understood very well that the logic of revolution meant the
destruction of the cathedrals, those sirens of a loathed ecclesiasti-
cism.54 In this century, Le Corbusier argued that through a "radi-
ant" reconstruction of entire cities, the modern psyche could be
reconciled to, and indeed made master of, modern technology. 55
That view was the subject of considerable polemics in Weimar and
128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (1955); (2) Architectural controls in historic zones entail certain express
or implied visual standards with regard to the character of the neighboring buildings-thus
regulation of these buildings avoids the problem of standardlessness that plagues other aes-
thetic zoning regulations. Ste, e.g., Town of Deering er reL Bittenbender v. Tibbets, 105 N.H.
481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964). In Anderson, Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUSE L. REV. 26 (1960),
cited by the Deerng court, 105 N.H. at 486, 202 A.2d at 235, the author suggests that historic
preservation regulations may have acted as the bridge between the early judicial condemna-
tion of aesthetic controls in land use regulation and the more recent approbation of the same
sorts of controls. Anderson, supra, at 45-46. See, e.g., State ex rel Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458
S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d
74 (1963); State ex rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955). Architectural control ordinances, in the absence of any
historic preservation component, still receive rough treatment from some courts, however. See,
e.g., City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 30 So. 2d 491 (1947);
Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of Olympia Fields, 104 Ill. App. 2d 218, 244 N.E.2d 369
(1968); Morristown Road Assocs. v. Mayor of Bernardsville, 163 N.J. Super. 58, 394 A.2d 157
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978). For a review of the current status of aesthetics as a basis for state
regulation, see Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder. A New Majority ofJurisdictionx Authorize
Aesthetic Regulation, 48 U. Mo. K.C.L. REv. 125 (1980).
53. See, e.g., N. PEVSNER, AN OUTLINE OF EUROPEAN ARCHITECTURE 7 (6th ed. 1960).
Pevsner remarked that architecture is not only aesthetically superior to the other arts (since
an architect's work encompasses sculptors' and painters' visual modes) but is also socially
superior The other arts need not be present in everyday life, but human beings always live
among structures, which exercise "subtle but penetrating effects . . ., noble or mean, re-
strained or ostentatious, genuine or meretricious." Id at 7. J.J. Dukeminier, in his argument
for a more straightforward legal recognition of aesthetic goals, made a more restrained claim
that architecture can have a "direct effect upon the equilibrium of the [individual's] personal-
ity and upon the happiness and richness of his life"-a view that the author based on "com-
mon sense conjecture." Dukeminier, Zoningfor Aesthetic Ojectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAw &
CONTENMP. PROB. 218, 231 & n.45 (1955).
54. See Bannister, Comment, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION TODAY, supra note 11, at 33,
34-35; cf H. KOENINGSBERGER & G. MOsSE, EUROPE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 82-83
(1968) (describing the manner in which the sixteenth-century monarchs adopted the grand
visual theatrics of Baroque architecture in order to impress viewers with the splendor of their
regimes).
55. C.E. JEANNERET-GRIS (LE CORBUSIER), THE RADIANT CITY 29-30, 91-97 (Orion
1967).
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Nazi Germany, as architects constructed grandiose designs for cul-
tural regeneration through the manipulation of structures.5 6 More
recently, the radical architect Robert Goodman has spoken of a
"guerilla architecture" of protest and has argued that new and more
highly personalized forms of architecture would accompany "cul-
tural revolution.
57
Thus the architects have continued to talk politics, and their
newer views on the "legibility" of a city58 help to identify the politi-
cal aspects of preservation law. It should give us pause, however, to
realize that in the past, architectural theory was also used to deci-
mate older structures and neighborhoods, and to replace them with
the urban renewal version of Le Corbusier's "radiant city" of super-
block highrises.59 In the most ironic twist in the legal history of his-
toric preservation for twenty years, judicial opinions favoring public
preservation measures have regularly quoted the Supreme Court's
ringing words in Berman v. Parker:6
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive . . . .
The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully pa-
trolled.6'
The opinions do not reveal the embarrassing origin of the language
they quote: Berman upheld the condemnation of a structurally sound
56. See B. MILLER LANE, ARCHITECTURE AND POLITICS IN GERMANY 1918-1945, at
41-65, 125-67, 185-216 (1968); R. TAYLOR, THE WORLD IN STONE: THE ROLE OF ARCHI-
TECTURE IN NATIONAL SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY (1974).
57. R. GOODMAN, AFTER THE PLANNERS 187-204 (1971).
58. See note 73 infra nd accompanying text.
59. See V. SCULLY, AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE AND URBANISM 165-71 (1969). R.
STERN, NEW DIRECTIONS IN AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE 80-114 (rev. ed. 1979), relates the
typical urban renewal projects to an "exclusivist" architectural attitude that seeks to'impose
relatively simple, prototypical, and formal architectural solutions across a whole range of
buildings and planning problems. Stern contrasts this attitude with an "inclusivist" style-
one that is more impressed with the complexity of problems and that attempts to accommo-
date new architecture to existing styles as well as to nonarchitectural values. See generally R.
VENTURI, COMPLEXITY AND CONTRADICTION IN ARCHITECTURE (2d ed. 1977).
60. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
61. Id at 31, 34-35. Many historic preservation cases have cited Berman. See, e.g., Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978); Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516
F.2d 1051, 1060 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976); Figarsky v. Historic Dist.
Comm'n, 171 Conn. 198,208, 368 A.2d 163, 170 (1976); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,
333 Mass. 773, 779, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (1955); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73
N.M. 410, 416, 389 P.2d 13, 17 (1964); Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n,
51 Misc. 2d 556, 559, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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building inconveniently located in an urban renewal area. 2
The courts' gradual withdrawal in preservation cases from all but
the most conclusory remarks on aesthetics may reflect a particularly
twentieth-century sensibility about the difficulty of aesthetic judg-
ments. As Stephen Williams has recently reminded us, artistic ex-
pression is especially resistant to precise evaluation, either as to
quality or as to effects.63 But however appropriate the judicial diffi-
dence about the substance of artistic expression and its political effects,
that very diffidence should lead courts to give closer attention to the
procedures through which others make these evaluations.64
The Berman-approved urban renewal projects show the need for
closer attention to procedure in public forays into architecture. Al-
though the apologists for urban renewal have rightly noted that its
programs meant many different things, including rehabilitation and
even some historic preservation activity,65 it most strikingly conjures
up the image of large clearance projects in low-income areas involv-
ing the demolition not only of historic structures, 66 but of entire
black and ethnic neighborhoods,67 and their replacement by massive
office buildings and highrise housing projects. Such projects met the
interests of potential financial backers and developers; some sites
were apparently selected with a deliberate regard to the weakness of
local neighborhood organization.68
62. Also rarely mentioned is the fact that Berman upheld an eminent domain proceed-
ing, whereas preservation cases frequently concern the validity of architectural controls as an
exercise of the police power without compensation. For an architectural control case that
mentions (but dismisses as immaterial) this difference, see State ex re. Saveland Park Holding
Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 272, 69 N.W.2d 217, 223, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
63. Williams, supra note 42, at 16-21; see Michelman, Toward a Practical Standard for Aes-
thetic Regulation, PRAC. LAW., Feb. 1969, at 36, 42. But see Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder.-
Aesthetics and Objectivit, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1438, 1442-47 (1973) (empirical studies do show
some aesthetic norms that are widely agreed upon).
64. Judicial decisions about architectural controls specifically for preservation have
been somewhat more attentive to procedure, perhaps because the relevant standards and
expertise seem more apparent. See South of Second Assocs. v. Georgetown, 196 Colo. 89, 91
n.l, 580 P.2d 807, 808 n.l (1978); note 52 supra.
65. Slayton, The Operation and Achievements of the Urban Renewal Program, in URBAN RE-
NEWAL, THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY 189 (J.Q. Wilson ed. 1966). For historic pres-
ervation in urban renewal projects, see U.S. URBAN RENEWAL ADMIN., HISTORIC
PRE.ERVATION THROUGH URBAN RENEWAL (1963), and U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND UR-
BAN DEVELOPMENT, PRESERVING HISTORIC AMERICA (1966). See also notes 134-202 infra
and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, U.S. CONFERENCE OF
MAYORS, WITH HERITAGE So RICH 133-34 (1966).
67. See NoteJudicial Review of Displacee Relocation in Urban Renewal, 77 YALE L.J. 966,
967 n.7 (1968).
68. See S. GREER, URBAN RENEWAL AND AMERICAN CITIES 40-41, 60, 81, 120 (1965).
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The history of urban renewal is an object lesson in the political
choices entailed in architectural decisions and in the serious disrup-
tions that may follow where architectural decisions go forth without
procedural protection for countervailing community interests. The
lesson ought not be lost on the historic preservationists, whose efforts
to save artistically meritorious structures have also looked to Berman
for legal support. If architectural decisions do have political conse-
quences, however difficult they may be to define, then surely we need
some consideration of how and when the community may participate
in those decisions.
While Gettysburg and the "inspirational" period of historic preser-
vation emphasize historic preservation as a means of fostering com-
munity ties, the "artistic merit" phase teaches a certain humility
about the aesthetic judgments entailed in preservation and a con-
comitant need to define procedures that assure an airing of views
among those concerned.
C. The Most Recent Phase: Preservation for Community
1. Substantive considerations.
The third phase of historic preservation builds on elements of the
past by expanding the substantive considerations implicit in Gettys-
burg and by increasing the attention paid to procedure. Although
the effects of urban renewal and the urban freeway projects scarcely
rival the effects of the Civil War battles that gave emotional
resonance to Gettysburg, the saga of shattered neighborhoods did
move architects and urbanologists to reconsider the political ramifi-
cations of the physical environment. The focus of this reconsidera-
tion, as in Gettysburg, was the contribution of the physical
environment to the maintenance of community-not the national
community as in Gettysburg, but the smaller community of the city
and neighborhood. Jane Jacobs's 1961 book, The Death and Life of
Great American Cities ,69 stressed the city dweller's need for buildings of
varying ages and uses, discussed the psychological and social conse-
quences of structural layout, and prescribed architecture that con-
tributes to neighborly interest in the community. More recently,
See general4y C. STONE, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND NEIGHBORHOOD DIscoNTENT (1976). For
an exhaustive study of this and related issues, see Note, Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal,
66 COLUM. L. REV. 485 (1966).
69. J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
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Oscar Newman's Defensible Space7" used many of Jacobs's ideas in ex-
ploring the use of architecture to encourage neighborhood crime pre-
vention. And in his Image of the Cigv,71 Kevin Lynch took the simple
phenomenon of not feeling lost 72 as a starting point for examining the
architectural qualities-scale, border, direction, the punctuation of
an occasional singular "landmark"-that make a neighborhood or a
city "legible"7 3 or "imageable" 74 in the viewer's mind. In the legible
city, not only can urban dwellers find their way, but the architectural
qualities themselves lend drama, interest, an occasion for anecdotes
about the past, and thus a framework for identification with the
shared experience of the community.
Although the contribution of architecture to community requires
further definition, this discussion does suggest a consistent and sub-
stantive foundation for public involvement in preservation efforts.
In the past 15 years, the community-oriented architectural discus-
sion has influenced the direction of public preservation activities, and
its vocabulary has entered the legal terminology of historic preserva-
tion. In the U.S. Conference of Mayors report, With Heritage So
Rich ,7 a volume widely regarded as the seminal work behind the
1966 National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),76 one finds the
claim that an historic district is a legislative attempt to preserve the
"village within the city."'77 Herbert Gans first used the phrase to de-
scribe Boston's West End,78 an ethnic neighborhood ultimately
cleared by urban renewal and something of a cause celebre in the anti-
urban renewal literature. 79 The NHPA's stated purpose of providing
a "sense of orientation to the American people"80 reflects Lynch's
70. 0. NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH URBAN DESIGN
(1972).
71. K. LYNCH, THE IMAGE OF THE CITY (1960).
72. Id at 4, 125.
73. Id at 2-6.
74. Id at 9-13.
75. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 66; see H.R. REP. No. 1916, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5, repnnted in [1966] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3307, 3308.
76. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976), as amended by National Historic Preservation Act
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987.
77. U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 66, at 31, citing Note, The Police Power,
Eminent Domain, and the Presenation of Historic Property, supra note 51, at 731.
78. H. GANS, THE URBAN VILLAGERS (1962).
79. See, e.g., Gans, The Failure of Urban Renewal, in URBAN RENEWAL, THE RECORD AND
THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 65, at 537, 540-42.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (1976), as amended by National Historic Preservation Act Amend-
ments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, sec. 101(a), § 1(b)(2), 94 Stat. 2987 (to be codified at 16
U.S.C. § 470(b)(2)). The National Environmental Protection Act's historic preservation sec-
tions also reflect the impact of the community-focused architectural discussion and view his-
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language. Local ordinances for historic districts routinely regulate
the scale of buildings in the districts,8 ' and guidelines for preserva-
tion rehabilitation often discuss the relationship of structures to the
visual definition of the entire street.82
As for the importance of orientation, when a Congressman asked
why Washington's embattled Willard Hotel was "historic" though
only 70 years old, a Park Service representative responded:
[A] lot of things make things historic. It is anything that gives a
place a sense of place . . . . And if we keep tearing down every-
thing which gives the city a sense of identity, and putting up dupli-
cates of commercial glass boxes . . . how do you know where you
are?
8 3
The Willard controversy gave courts an opportunity to comment on
a community-building rationale for preservation. The decision in
Commissioner of the District of Columbia v. Benenson,84 one step in the
protracted litigation over the Willard, favored the hotel's owners
over the preservationists but acknowledged the ways in which his-
toric structures strengthen the links of a community:
There may well be those who think it lamentable that this hand-
some old hotel may soon be demolished. Retention of fine architec-
ture, especially in the capital of a relatively young country such as
ours, lends a certain stability and cultural continuity, which can
only contribute over the years to national substance. If one looks at
the architecture of a city and sees only the present, the feeling of
toric preservation as part of "an environment which supports diversity and variety of
individual choice," a phrase that echoes Jane Jacobs's views. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1976).
81. Eg., ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE § 16-35006(c)(2); Charleston, S.C., Ordinance
1966-12, § 3 (Aug. 16, 1966),asamendedby Charleston, S.C., Ordinance 1973-11, § 2 (Apr. 10,
1973) (current version at CHARLESTON, S.C., CITY CODE § 54-31(2)). Seattle, Wash., Ordi-
nance 106348, § 3.01(6) (Apr. 4, 1977) graphically takes Lynch-like criteria into account in
one of the categories for landmark designation: A structure may have significant "character,
interest or value" in history if, "because of its prominence of spatial location, contrasts of
siting, age, or scale, it is an easily identifiable visual feature of its neighborhood and contrib-
utes to the distinctive quality or identity of such neighborhood or the city."
82. E.g., ROCKVILLE HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION, ADOPTED ARCHITECTURAL
DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR THE EXTERIOR REHABILITATION OF BUILDINGS IN RoCKVILLE'S
HISTORIC DISTRICTS (1977) (accompanying A. SENKEVITCH, ROCKVILLE HISTORIc DIs-
TRICTS PRELIMINARY PRESERVATION PLAN (1977)); see N. WEINBERG, supra note 4, at 138.
83. Oversight Hearing on Pennslvania Avenue Development Plan: Hearing Before the Subcaom. on
Parks and Recreation ofthe House Comm. on Interior and Insular Afairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65
(1975) (statement of E. Connally) [hereinafter cited as Oversight Hearing]. For somewhat com-
parable considerations in recent British preservation planning, see LEEDS CIVIC TRUST, CON-
SERVATION AREAS: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATION 16 (1975). This report discusses the
importance of public participation in preservation planning, as well as the maintenance of
the "social fabric" of existing communities and the preservation of historically and architec-
turally important structures that form a part of the "familiar scene."
84. 329 A.2d 437 (D.C. 1974).
[Vol. 33:473
HeinOnline -- 33 Stan. L. Rev. 490 1980-1981
HISTORIC PRESER VA TION
character is missing.
85
If community-building is the central direction of recent preserva-
tion activity, several consequences follow. First, the age and fame of
a structure are only two among several elements, including scale, dis-
tinctiveness of design, and location, that should be considered in as-
sessing a building's importance to the community. Second, because a
community exists over time, the present members are to be consid-
ered valuable. However important it may be to conserve the indicia
of the past, some latitude must remain for the contributions of the
present. Third, a community-building rationale should place preser-
vation-and the physical surroundings generally-in a larger per-
spective of community needs. Finally, if it is recognized that physical
surroundings play a political role in the community, the treatment of
those surroundings cannot be viewed as the preserve of aesthetes and
bluebloods, but must become an issue for a broader constituency.
2. Procedural considerations.
Here the substance of a community-oriented rationale blends into
procedure. Who should assess the value of the physical environment
and weigh it against competing needs? What forms should the evalu-
ation take? It is no coincidence that the community orientation in
modern preservation law has multiplied the devices through which
neighborhood groups can command a role in the debate over poten-
tially destructive projects. Much preservation litigation and many
delays in the destruction of older structures have been possible only
because of the proliferation of procedural devices around which
neighborhood and local groups can organize.
Although the statutes creating these devices seldom link them ex-
plicitly to the community-building rationale, the new historic preser-
vation procedures are fruit of the same tree. First, many of these
procedures, like the community-building rationale, derive from a
conscious reaction against the depredations of oversized government
construction projects. Take, for example, the changing features of
the federal highway program, where procedural amendments in 1966
85. Id at 441-42 (footnote omitted). The public interest groups that litigated and lob-
bied for the Willard also seem to take a community-building approach to preservation. One
of the most active, Don't Tear It Down, is interested in preservation as part of the entire
"built environment" and "livable design" of the community. Interview with Judith Sobel,
Executive Director of Don't Tear It Down, in Washington, D.C. (July 24, 1979); see statement
of Carol Bickley, President of Don't Tear It Down, in Oversight Hearing, supra note 83, at
79-80. For this reason, the organization would not favor, for example, the retention of an old
facade at the cost of a better building of good contemporary design. Interview, supra.
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and 1968 included not only environmental and historic preservation
review, but also some local participation in what had been largely a
state and federal decision process.86 The legislative history of the
1968 amendments cited past neglect of the "urban environment
'"8 7
and suggested procedural means by which to overcome that neglect:
namely, the inclusion of local governments in route selection deci-
sions.
Moreover, other recent preservation procedures have in practice
been used primarily by neighborhood groups, even against larger lo-
cal governments.88 These procedural devices provide a centerpiece
for community organization that in itself can strengthen neighbor-
hoods by encouraging the process of community self-definition.
Finally, the new thinking on the substantive aspects of historic
preservation suggests that procedures are required by which local res-
idents can be asked about the physical elements that make a commu-
nity "legible." Lynch's inquiry in Image of the Ciy suggests that a
community-oriented architectural theory must be linked to a process
of community information-gathering and self-education." Archi-
tects and other professionals may play an important role in the edu-
cational process, but the focus on community-building requires a
retreat from architectural imperialism and an acceptance of commu-
nity definition by community residents.
D. Communigy-Building and Political Thought
1. Arts in a democratic regime.
A community-building rationale for historic preservation could
contribute to several traditional topics of American political thought.
The first of these matters is the role of the arts in a democratic re-
gime. The newer thinking on preservation, like the Gettysburg case in
the nineteenth century, attributes political significance to physical
surroundings. It thereby links historic preservation to a public dis-
cussion that dates from the founding of the nation: the quest for
artistic forms appropriate to a republican government? °
86. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 18(a), 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976); Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-574, § 15(a), 80 Stat. 771 (current version at 23 U.S.C.
§ 138 (1976)).
87. S. REP. No. 1340, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, repintedin [1968] 3 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 3482, 3492-93.
88. See, e.g., notes 223-24 infra and accompanying text.
89. K. LYNCH, supra note 71, at 140-59.
90. See N. HARRIS, THE ARTIST IN AMERICAN SocI-TY 28-53, 159-65, 208 (1966); J.
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That early discussion did not always make life easy for artists.
Some eighteenth-century theorists-and much of the public-re-
garded the arts with hostility, as temptresses of a voluptuousness that
would corrode the virtue requisite to republican government.9 ' But
others, particularly as the nineteenth century progressed, viewed ar-
tistic works as blandishments to reflection, sociability, and generos-
ity.92 Despite the content of these early discussions and their
occasionally ludicrous vagaries (one 1790 essay argued that brick
houses are the only suitable dwellings in a republic), 93 the partici-
pants at least paid the arts the compliment of taking seriously their
political significance.
A consideration of that significance may be an inescapable part
of any coherent rationale for the public support of historic preserva-
tion. The newer thinking about historic preservation has begun to
revive, in an imaginative and provocative manner, the much older
inquiry into the political connotations of artistic and architectural
style. The tentativeness with which the "aesthetic" court decisions
approached the role of the arts is an appropriate reminder of the
problems it can create. Although caution is in order where politics
crosses the arts and may bear on issues of speech and expression cen-
tral to our political enterprise,94 this difficulty cannot itself withdraw
artistic expression from politics. It can, however, serve as a warning
KASSON, CIVILIZING THE MACHINE: TECHNOLOGY AND REPUBLICAN VALUES IN AMERICA
1776-1900, at 142-47 (1976).
91. John Adams, who was certainly attracted to the arts, nevertheless wrote to Jefferson
in 1816, "Every one of the fine Arts from the earliest times has been inlisted in the service of
Superstition and Despotism." Letter from John Adams to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 16, 1816),
2 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 502-03 (L. Cappon ed. 1959) (quoted in J. KASSON,
supra note 90, at 143-44). See N. HARRIS, supra note 90, at 28-53. As these authors note,
some of the theoretical arguments derive from earlier European thinkers, particularly Plato
and Montesquieu, and most particularly Rousseau. See general L. MILLER, PATRONS AND
PATRIOTISM: THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE FINE ARTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1790-1860
(1966); Lynes, How a Few Artists Wormed Their Wa in the Course of a Centua into the Confmdence of a
Small Percentage of Their Compatriots, in THE SHAPING OF ART AND ARCHITECTURE IN NINE-
TEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 104 (1972).
92. See N. HARRIS, supra note 90, at 159-62. See generally L. MILLER, supra note 91, at
8-32.
93. On the Architecture of America, AM. MUSEUM, Oct. 1790, at 176, cited in N. HARRIS,
supra note 90, at 43-44 & n.77.
94. See note 127 in/ia. Art works in public view may be particular objects of political
discussion. See, e.g., O'Doherty, Public Art and the Government: A Progress Report, in 2 J. MER-
RYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 5-67, 5-73 (1974) (National En-
dowment for the Arts support of "public art" results in "inevitably socio-political" dialogue
within communities).
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against rigidity and as a reminder that any conclusions are necessar-
ily approximate.
2. Community-building and majo'tarianism.
A community-building rationale relates historic preservation to
the most striking observation of Tocqueville's analysis of America
and of modern egalitarian regimes: that we need to overcome the
isolation and rootlessness that leave individuals no support against an
overbearing majority. The same concern underlies American politi-
cal science's preoccupation with the health of pluralistic institu-
tions.95
This century's European totalitarian regimes effected the terrori-
zation of their citizenry in part through the suppression of institu-
tions that could orient and support individuals.96 The European
experience suggests that the appropriate antidote is not so much a
sense of national community as the sense of cohesion that comes from
local communities. Tocqueville spoke of the countermajoritarian
benefits of voluntary organizations. 97 But since, as Marvin Meyers
has pointed out, these organizations run against the grain in an egali-
tarian regime,98 they need all the support they can get.
It is in reinforcing decentralized and pluralistic community-
building that historic preservation law may make its most important
contribution to our political life. Its substantive effects on our physi-
cal surroundings, including older structures and neighborhoods, can
help to give residents a feeling of stability and familiarity, and they
can aid in creating a sense of community among neighbors. Proce-
durally, the very process of community self-definition, including the
procedures of modern historic preservation law, brings neighbors to-
gether in mutual education and mutual aid, helping to prevent a
paralyzing sense of individual powerlessness. With these considera-
tions in mind, I turn to an evaluation of the most important current
programs for public support of historic preservation.
95. See generally Connolly, The Challenge of Pluralist Theog, in THE BIAS OF PLURALISM 3
(W. Connolly ed. 1969).
96. See generaly H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (2d ed. 1958); C.
FRIEDRICH & Z. BRZEZINSKI, TOTALITARIAN DICTATORSHIP AND AUTOCRACY (1965).
97. See 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 129-34 (12th ed. 1898).
98. See M. MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION 36-42, 50-54 (2d ed. 1960). See
also Connolly, supra note 95, at 5.
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I. THE COMMUNITY-BUILDING RATIONALE AND CURRENT
PROGRAMS FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION
A few years ago, George Lefcoe identified private development
and governmental projects as two major sources of neighborhood de-
struction.9 The control of these agents could as easily be identified
as the chief object of historic preservation efforts-and as another
indication of the relationship between historic preservation and
neighborhood organization. 00
Architectural controls on private construction and demolition
plans are the most significant preservation controls on private devel-
opment. These controls seek to protect both individual "landmark"
buildings and entire areas included in "historic districts." The re-
view-and-comment proceeding'0 ' is the most significant control over
governmental programs. Landmark and district architectural con-
trols are chiefly a matter of local administration, while review-and-
comment procedures either are federal or are modeled on federal leg-
islation. Important, though sometimes indirect, state components
are found in both protective devices, however. State legislation, for
example, enables municipalities to enact architectural controls; and
state historic preservation officers inject state and local sites into the
federal review-and-comment process by nominating them to the Na-
tional Register. 10 2 The discussion that follows, therefore, concen-
trates on local landmark and district controls and on federal review-
and-comment procedures, but it also touches on important preserva-
tion contributions from the states. The discussion also explores re-
lated local and federal devices such as tax benefits and grant
programs.
99. Lefcoe, The Neighborhood Defenders, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 823, 826 (1976). Lefcoe
regarded government programs and especially urban renewal as a more serious destroyer of
neighborhoods in the United States than in other Western countries. See id at 843-45. See
also C. STONE, supra note 68 (Atlanta urban renewal programs).
100. For examples of historic preservation used for neighborhood conservation, see N.
WEINBERG, .pra note 4, at 121-47.
101. See notes 233-60 infra and accompanying text.
102. In addition, state legislation sometimes designates historic districts in which local
architectural controls apply. See, e.g., Minnesota Historic District Act of 1971, MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 138.71-.75 (West 1979); Act Creating the Historic Beacon Hill District, ch. 616, 1955
Mass. Acts 513. Moreover, some states have environmental and preservationist review-and-
comment procedures of their own; in the case of California's Environmental Quality Act,
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-21176 (West 1977 & Supp. 1979), these procedures may have
wide-ranging consequences for both public and private development. See Comment, Alterna-
lives to Destructio: Two New Developments in Historic Preservation, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 719
(1979). For a summary of this and other state legislation, see Significant State Statutes, supra
note 14.
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In discussing these programs, I follow the traditional division of
"substance" and "procedure"-an imperfect division but one that,
despite inevitable overlap, has some heuristic value in sorting out the
major elements of historic preservation law. I begin with the pro-
grams that highlight most sharply the substantive aspects of historic
preservation: local architectural controls on landmarks and districts.
In the subsequent "procedural" sections, I discuss the procedural as-
pects of both the architectural control committees and the other ma-
jor set of procedural devices for preservation: federal review-and-
comment legislation.
A. Landmarks and Districts: The Competing Considerations
1. The pattern ofpreservation control.
Although differences exist among preservationist architectural or-
dinances, most display a basic pattern. The ordinances prescribe
methods for designating selected structures or districts as "historic"
and for assessing individual applications to alter landmarks or
properties within designated areas."0 3 Under most ordinances, an ar-
chitectural control board or committee performs these tasks. The
boards often must include professionals in the fields of architecture,
history, art history, and archeology;'0 4 many also include builders or
other real estate professionals.' 0 5 Presumably, members bring the
standards of their professions to the tasks of landmark designation
and review of applications to alter historic properties.
Local ordinances often specify standards according to which
structures or areas are to be deemed "historic." These standards vary
from place to place, but many closely parallel criteria of the National
Register of Historic Places or the earlier National Landmarks crite-
ria. 106 Local criteria for the grant or denial of individual construc-
tion permits vary more than the criteria for initial landmark
designation.
The criteria for alterations within historic districts are especially
complex.'0 7 They almost always give some consideration to the com-
patibility of the proposed change with the property's or district's his-
103. See, e.g., NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, RECOMMENDED
MODEL PROVISIONS FOR A PRESERVATION ORDINANCE WITH ANNOTATIONS (1980) (excel-
lent compilation of provisions from various local landmark ordinances). See generall' notes
203-32 in~fa and accompanying text.
104. See note 203 infra and accompanying text.
105. See note 205 infra and accompanying text.
106. See note 41 supra.
107. See notes 134-202 infra and accompanying text.
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toric features. Some legislation includes special hardship provisions
for individual owners,10 8 and other legislation envisions balancing
the public benefits of alterations against the costs of losing an historic
property or feature."0 9
Although designation, permit procedures, and review committees
are features common to landmark and historic district regulation,
landmarks and districts nevertheless raise some distinctly different is-
sues in historic preservation regulation. The following sections first
explore landmark, and then historic district regulation.
2. Landmark regulation.
The landmark is typically an individual building, and its role in a
community-oriented preservation effort may seem somewhat ob-
scure. A landmark does, though, help foster community cohesion. A
frequent rationale for landmark designation is the building's associa-
tion with past events or notable persons; its physical presence can
unite the community by reminding members of a common past. The
landmark can be a focal point for direction-finding; a particularly
striking old building may, in Lynch's terms, lend "legibility" or
"imageability" to a city simply because everyone knows where it is
and can locate other places by reference to it. Or it may, by its artis-
try or by the drama or oddity of its decoration, serve as a point of
shared pride, curiosity, or amusement to the community.110
Despite the landmark's potential for unifying the community,
there are problems of equity resulting from the landmark's being sin-
gled out for special treatment. Since landmark designation usually
imposes restrictions on the owner's alterations of the property, an
owner may be forced to bear the burden of diminished property
value and in effect to pay for the community's preservation prefer-
ences through an assessment not placed on the owners of ordinary
properties. To be sure, landmark designation may provide some ben-
efits to some landmark owners, as the preservationists argue; designa-
108. E.g., Act Creating the Historic Beacon Hill District, ch. 616, § 7, 1955 Mass. Acts
513.
109. E.g., Washington, D.C., Law 2-144, §§ 3(j), 3(k), 5(e), 6(0, 7(e) (Dec. 27, 1978).
110. The "way-finding" justification may, of course, depend on the location and sur-
roundings of the landmark. Some landmark ordinances acknowledge this. See, e.g., Seattle,
Wash., Ordinance 106348, § 3.01 (Apr. 4, 1977). For amusement value, the reader is referred
to the endearing whimsy of Lucy, an enormous century-old wooden elephant at Margate,
New Jersey, preserved in part through local business effort and now a designated National
Register property. Lucy's photograph is in R. WARNER, S. GROFF & R.P. WARNER, Supra
note 19, at 217.
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tion may give the structure greater notoriety and may assure the
present owner that the property will not be altered in the future.
Many owners nominate their own properties for landmark status,
presumably to take advantage of these benefits. But for the owner
who resists landmark designation and control, the burden probably
outweighs the benefits.
The United States Supreme Court in Penn Central rejected the ar-
gument that the burdens of landmark regulation amount to a "tak-
ing" of property, at least where the owner retains reasonable
beneficial use.'' Before that decision, legislatures in many jurisdic-
tions were apparently aware that landmark control might subject
owners to special burdens. Perhaps because the constitutional status
of landmark controls was uncertain, these legislatures made available
special direct or indirect bonuses for landmarks.' 1 2 Even New York
City, whose regulations were at issue in Penn Central, attempts to pro-
tect a "reasonable return" 1' 3 on landmark properties. New York also
makes -some effort to lessen the burden on landmark owners through
tax relief".4 and an elaborate zoning scheme for transferable develop-
ment rights." 5 The most serious problem with Penn Central may be
111. 438 U.S. 104, 137-38 (1978).
112. See, e.g., Shull, The Use of Tax Incentives for Historic Preservation, 8 CONN. L. REV. 334
(1976). John Costonis, one of the chief scholars on the idea of "transfer of development
rights" in landmark preservation, advocates such transfers as a form of "fair compensation"
that falls between the highest-use compensation of eminent domain and the absence of com-
pensation under the police power. For his theory, see Costonis, Fair Compensation andthe Accom-
modation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1021 (1975); see Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Rep.y to Professor
Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1976), for a critique.
113. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0 (1976). Many of
New York's landmark cases have focused on this "reasonable return" requirement. See, e.g.,
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914
(1977), aj'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Lutheran Church in America v. City of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d
121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974); Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29
A.D.2d 376, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1968); Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n,
51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
114. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8-A, § 207-8.0(b)-(c) (1976).
115. NEW YORK, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 74-79, 791, 792, 793 (1968), cited in
Marcus, Air Rights Transfer in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 372, 374 & n.8
(1971). Under such schemes, the owner of restricted properties may "sell" unused air space to
other properties, enabling the "buyer" to erect a structure that exceeds the height or bulk
limits that would otherwise apply. Some of the difficulties with New York's plan are dis-
cussed in Costonis, The Chicago Planw Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmark,
supra note 16, at 586-89 (comparison with more elaborate scheme for Chicago's landmarks).
Seattle's landmark ordinance provides for "economic incentives" that may be granted "as
consideration for the imposition of controls on a designated landmark site or landmark."
Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 106348, § 1.03(9) (Apr. 4, 1977). These incentives in practice usu-
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that it discourages such benefit schemes, 1 6 or may at least discourage
schemes that go beyond New York's rather frail efforts.
In the post-Penn Central era, disgruntled owners may combat
landmark designation with a procedural variant to the "taking" ar-
gument: that landmark designation so affects the property's value
that the owner must at least be given notice and a right to contest
designation. Although many ordinances provide for notification to
the landmark owner, local regulations may provide that a building is
protected as soon as it is placed under consideration for landmark
designation-even before the owner has received notice-and that
no permit for alteration or demolition may be granted until the ar-
chitectural committee has reviewed it."t 7 Nonconsenting landmark
owners may contend that such provisions give them inadequate op-
portunity to contest landmark designation or to avoid the effects that
designation may bring for their property.
An analogous argument emerged in connection with the National
Register of Historic Places and indeed carried the day in the 1980
amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act." 8 These
amendments permit owner objections to block the listing of a prop-
erty on the National Register. Many preservationists have resisted
ally take the form of zoning relief, e.g., permission for additional parking spaces. Interview
with staff member, Seattle Dep't of Urban Conservation, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 23, 1979).
116. In the wake of the Penn Central decision, Chicago's landmarks commission report-
edly ceased paying compensation for development rights when it denied demolition permits.
Stronger Preservation Laws Sought AfJer as a Result of Grand Central Decision, [ 1978] 6 Hous. & DEy.
REP. (BNA) 247.
117. This appears to be the effect of the regulations under the Washington, D.C.,
landmarks preservation law. District of Columbia Department of Housing and Community
Development, Rules of Procedure Pursuant to D.C. Law 2-144, § 1.1(j) (July 12, 1979); Inter-
view with staff member, Washington, D.C. Dep't of Housing and Community Development,
in Washington, D.C. (July 25, 1979).
118. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, sec.
201(a), § 101(a)(6), 94 Stat. 2987 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(6)). The owner con-
sent controversy had been brewing earlier. During the markup of the fiscal year 1980 Interior
Department appropriations in the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Inte-
rior, an effort was made to require owner consent for National Register designation on the
ground that designation without consent was an unconstitutional taking. Preservation Ac-
tion, June 1979, at 1 (bulletin of Preservation Action). Preservation Action, a lobbying
group, immediately attacked the argument with a memo which, relying on Penn Central, ar-
gued that National Register designation and the attendant tax incentives and limitations
were much less restrictive than many other regulations upheld by the Supreme Court. D.
Bonderma~n, Memorandum (1979) (legal opinion prepared for Preservation Action). The
final House Appropriations rider required owner consent only where Heritage Conservation
and Recreation Service grants were used to designate industrial properties under the National
Historic Landmarks program. See Oldham, Federal Tar Provisions and the Federal Framework for
Historic Presevation, 12 URB. LAW. 66, 72 (1980).
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owner consent provisions, taking the view that placement on the
Register is merely honorific and causes no changes for which an own-
er's consent should be asked.' 9 This view is unrealistic, however.
First, National Register status itself sometimes triggers local protec-
tive restrictions, 20 particularly architectural committee review of
proposed changes in the property. 2 ' Second, the 1976 Tax Reform
Act treats National Register properties differently from other proper-
ties. Indeed, this tax statute may have triggered the debate on owner
consent; while the Act's incentive provisions substantially benefit the
owner who rehabilitates a National Register property, 22 the Act's
demolition disincentives prevent the owner of a Register property
from deducting demolition expenses or claiming accelerated depreci-
ation on a new structure built upon the site.'
23
The Penn Central decision is an obstacle to arguing that differen-
tial tax treatment constitutes a "taking"; nevertheless, the designat-
ing authorities have made some implicit concessions to the
landowner's concerns. Even before the new provisions for owner no-
tification and objection, federal preservation offices established elab-
orate procedures for owner notification of National Register
nomination, procedures that, until modified, explicitly required
description of the tax consequences of Register status and gave own-
ers an opportunity to comment on the potential designation of their
properties. 124
A community-building perspective on landmark procedures sug-
gests serious questions about long-term benefits. From an economic
standpoint, one might ask whether landmark designation and regula-
tion impose such burdens as to discourage builders from investing in
good or unusual architecture in the first place. Might not the origi-
nal builders aim rather at mediocrity, because they know that pro-
spective future owners may run the risk of landmark controls and
119. Interview with Nellie Longsworth, President of Preservation Action, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (July 25, 1979); Interview with staff member, Seattle Dep't of Urban Conservation,
supra note 115. For a contrary view, see Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F.
Supp. 839, 853 (E.D. Va. 1980).
120. E.g., Washington, D.C., Law 2-144, § 3(e)-() (Dec. 27, 1978).
121. Id §§5, 6.
122. I.R.C. §§ 191, 167(o).
123. Id §§ 280B, 167(n).
124. 41 Fed. Reg. 5904 (1976), as amended by 42 Fed. Reg. 14,097 (1977). These proce-
dures were modified substantially by interim regulations vesting more responsibility in state
preservation offices and passing over in silence the explicit requirement that owners be noti-
fied about tax consequences and given an opportunity to comment. 44 Fed. Reg. 64,407
(1979) (current version at 36 C.F.R. §§ 1202.12-.13 (1980)).
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consequently pay less for a creative or imaginative building? If so,
landmark regulation may work to dampen creativity and in the long
run may deprive the community of imaginative and dramatic archi-
tecture. 
25
In other ways, however, landmark regulation may encourage cre-
ative design. Besides the incentives from special tax or zoning bene-
fits that legislatures can-and do-accord to the designated
landmark property,' 26 it is arguable that restrictions on landmark al-
teration might encourage builders, knowing that their investment
may be preserved indefinitely, to strive for creative excellence. This
view ascribes to the original builder a desire to make some lasting
artistic statement-an ascription that certainly seems plausible in the
case of architecture, the most public of art forms.127 For example,
one nineteenth-century commentator said about homebuilding:
"'Nothing is more remote from selfishness than generous expenditure
in building up a home, and enriching it with all that shall make it
beautiful without and lovely within. A man who builds a noble
house does it for the whole neighborhood, not for himself alone.' ,,t28
125. For variations on this theme, see Hershman, Critical Legal Issues in Hitoric Presera-
lion, 12 URB. LAwV. 19, 28 (1980); Note, Allocating the Cost of HiLtoric Preservation for the Isolated
Landowner, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 646, 648 (1979).
126. See notes 112-15 supra and accompanying text. Aside from tax benefits and zoning
relief, historic properties are eligible for special rehabilitation loans in some jurisdictions.
North Carolina, for example, has established a statewide revolving fund for preservation
loans. Howard, Revolving Funds: In the Vanguardofthe Preservation Movement, I 1 N.C. CENT. L.J.
256, 257-59 (1980). A number of localities, including Seattle and San Francisco, have similar
loan funds which are described in Galbreath, supra note 17.
127. The argument for first amendment protection of architecture rests on the view that
architecture is a "statement" to the public, or at least some form of speech or expression. See
Williams, supra note 42, at 35; Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning and the First Amendment, 28
STAN. L. REV. 179 (1975); Note, Architectural Expression: Police Power and the First Amendment,
supra note 51. But Williams also alludes to architecture's "speech" to a captive audience,
Williams, supra note 42, at 24, 28, a point that, according to Williams, lends legitimacy to its
regulation, id at 24.
128. H.W. BEECHER, NORWOOD; OR, VILLAGE LIFE IN NEw ENGLAND 213 (1892),
quoted in N. HARRIS, supra note 90, at 215. Comments of this sort underlie an interesting
subtheme in historic preservation literature: the view that the owner of an historic building
holds the property in trust for the public. See, e.g., American Scenic and Historic Preservation
Society, 13th Annual Report 168, 169 (1908), cited i C. HOSMER, supra note 4, at 95 n.96
(remarks of Edward Hall, Secretary of the American Scenic and Historic Preservation Soci-
ety, to the effect that even privately owned historic places may take on the character of public
property). The argument runs through today's preservationist literature. For example, it is
one of the foundations of some preservationists' position that owner consent should not be
required for designation on the National Register of Historic Places: The owner is merely the
"trustee" for the public and is not entitled to dispose of the property on the basis of private
interest. Interview with Nellie Longsworth, supra note 119.
But what is the source of the public's interest in such properties? If there is anything to
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Landmark regulation, then, by holding out the hope of long-term
protection, could encourage public architectural "statements" of im-
agination and drama. To be sure, this argument would be far more
persuasive if there were no private law devices (such as easements
and covenants) by which the original builder could attain the same
protection. 129 I raise it only to suggest the ambiguity of incentives for
the original builder to invest in creative and dramatic construction.
Concern about landmark restrictions is better focused on current
owners. They may never have wished to make an architectural state-
ment, and they may be alienated from the community because they
are singled out to pay for its preservation preferences or are pre-
vented from making an alternative investment in the community's
well-being, whether with another architectural "statement" or some
other needed public facility.1
3 0
The foregoing analysis suggests several directions for a commu-
nity-conscious landmarks ordinance. First, a locality should recog-
nize that even though landmark control may not be a "taking" since
Penn Central, it is desirable to have some consent or compensation
scheme to protect developers, owners, and builders, to whose creative
endeavors the community must look for future contributions to the
urban environment.
13 1
this argument, the "trust" must derive from the original "dedication": Architecture makes a
public statement, and that statement becomes public property; like any other property, this
property may become more valuable over time. It is noteworthy that many landmark preser-
vation ordinances limit the scope of public control to exterior alterations; perhaps this limita-
tion recognizes that the scope of the original "dedication" extended no further than those
areas that had some public audience.
129. Some of these private devices have involved enforcement problems that have been
removed statutorily only in the recent past. See note 15 supra and accompanying text; Narth
Carolina Legislature Enacts Package of Bills Recommended by Preservation Committee, Landmarks and
Historic Districts Commissions, June 1979, at 2, col. 2 (Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation
newsletter) (comments on North Carolina statutory clarification of the enforceability, assigna-
bility, and duration of preservation easements).
130. See, e.g., Wash. Post, July 26, 1979, § A, at 12, col. 1 (editorial concerning the
impending destruction of the facade of the old Keith-Albee movie theater). The editorial
suggested that after a 1ib-year delay and fruitless negotiation, a new building might make a
greater contribution than the old: "There is a value to preserving the city's history in stone,
but there is also a value to providing for the city's economic future." In this instance, a happy
ending appeared the next day, when city officials apparently agreed to certain zoning or
building code concessions in exchange for retention of the threatened facade. Id, July 27,
1979, § C, at 9, col. 4.
131. See Gold, The Wefare Economics of Historic Preservation, 8 CONN. L. REV. 348, 368-69
(1976); Note, Allocating the Cost of Historic Preservation, sufira note 125, at 663. On the "demoral-
ization costs" of noncompensation generally, see Michelman, Propery, Uilit, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethica/Foundations of'Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-24
(1967).
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Second, it is crucial that landmark designations avoid the appear-
ance of unpredictability and caprice, and that the standards and pro-
cedures for landmark designation and control be clear from the
outset. Buyers will then value the properties accordingly and be fore-
closed from arguing that landmark designation causes an unexpected
loss. This need for standards again bespeaks our need for a theory of
the public purposes to be served by historic preservation; articulation
of those public purposes would give rise to standards, and standards
give notice to property owners. If the major public purpose of mod-
ern preservation law is community-building, landmark designation
will value dramatic structures and beacon locations as well as the
sheer age that gives rise to familiarity and evokes common memories.
A delineation of preservation goals must place preservation in the
context of other community needs, thereby suggesting a third feature
for landmark designation and protection: a provision which allows
the landmark owner to argue that other pressing community needs
outweigh the need for exact retention of an older structure. Here
again, of course, it is critically important to have an articulable the-
ory of the political value of architectural surroundings; without such
a theory there is no ground on which to weigh preservation more
heavily than other community needs, or indeed to weigh preservation
at all.
Finally, a community-conscious preservation ordinance might
better be enforced through a delay of the owner's proposed changes
than through absolute prohibition of demolition or alteration. Mere
delay, although not costless, gives landmark owners a weaker moral
position from which to complain of caprice and special burden.
32
Delay gives all sides an opportunity to publicize their positions and
to hear the positions of others; it may enable the would-be developer
and those who wish to preserve a structure to arrive at a compromise
position such as retention of a facade or adaptive reuse of the old
structure. 13 3 Enforcement by delay affords each side the opportunity
to educate the other and to educate the public about the community
132. J. Silverstone, Historic District Preservation 59 (1962) (unpublished thesis in Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School Library). The author cites a number of preservation officials
who yiew voluntary compliance as the ultimate goal and delay as a valuable tool in attaining
that goal. Since delay still imposes costs on the owner, however, it has been urged that delay
in public land use decisions be compensated by a method analogous to eminent domain. Set
Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel County, 271 Md. 265, 316 A.2d 807 (1974); Marles,
Land Use Control through Municipal Delay: The Case for an Eminent Domain Remed, 11 URB. LAW.
311 (1979); Note, Landmark Preservation Laws: Compensation for Temporay Taking, 35 U. CHI. L.
REV. 362 (1968).
133. Pyke, Architectural Controls and the Individual Landmark, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
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values at stake in the preservation of old structures or'in their re-
placement by other structures. In short, enforcement through delay
would make landmark preservation a function of community educa-
tion and community pressure-a desirable goal if preservation is to
serve community-building.
3. Histoyic district regulation.
Historic landmark regulation typically pits an individual devel-
oper against the larger community. Historic district regulation, on
the other hand, seems less likely to produce such conflict. First, strin-
gent architectural controls usually apply to all properties within the
district and thus, like ordinary zoning regulations, arguably give re-
ciprocal benefits to all the owners.134 Unlike landmark owners, the
owners of property within an historic district, knowing that their
neighbors' property is subject to comparable controls, can be assured
that restoration of an original mansard roof will not be visually over-
powered by a chartreuse door on a neighbor's garage. Second, the
very character of historic districts seem to foster participation rather
than rancor; if, as proponents say, the historic district creates the
"village within the city,"' 35 the district should be a place where com-
munity values are especially preserved.
Unfortunately, historic districts produce some rancors peculiarly
their own, rancors that are ironically reminiscent of the very urban
renewal projects that once devastated so many older neighborhoods.
In both their motivations and their problems, historic district regula-
tions have eerily mirrored urban renewal. Municipalities have tradi-
tionally undertaken historic district regulation not in order to foster
community, but rather for fiscal purposes: Historic districts are
thought to attract tourists 136 and to act as a centerpiece for middle-
398, 404 (1971); R. WARNER, S. GROFF & R.P. WARNER, srupra note 19, gives a number of
examples of such compromises. See also Guidelines, supra note 41, at 47.
134. Many ordinances treat historic district regulation as zoning; recent ordinances fre-
quently refer to district regulations as "overlay zones" that add to existing land use zoning
without superseding it. See note 217 infra and accompanying text.
135. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
136. This point has been stressed repeatedly in statutes, ordinances, and case law. See,
e.g., Bohannan v. City of San Diego, 30 Cal. App. 3d 416, 422, 106 Cal. Rptr. 333, 336 (4th
Dist. 1973); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 858, 5 So. 2d 129, 131 (1941);
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 333 Mass. 773, 780, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (1966); City of
Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 417, 389 P.2d 13, 18 (1964); Ch. 395, § 2,
1970 Mass. Acts 237; Charleston, S.C., Ordinance 1966-12, § 3 (Aug. 16, 1966), a armendedby
Charleston, S.C., Ordinance 1973-11, § 2 (Apr. 10, 1973) (current version at CHARLESTON,
S.C., CITY CODE § 54-23); MENDOCINO CO., CAL., ZONING CODE art. 42, § 20-111 (enacted
1973). These statements of purpose may be taken with a grain of salt, particularly in the
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class residential and business investment in the city. 137 As in urban
renewal, these motives, though blameless in themselves, have resulted
in two characteristic threats to community values. The first of these
concerns design: District regulation may place too much weight on
uniformity. The second concerns social divisions: Regulation may
contribute to the disruption of neighborhoods, particularly low-in-
come neighborhoods. The following subsections examine these two
problems in detail.
Districts and design. The number of historic districts has been esti-
mated at 1900, t38 but most are the product of the past decade or so.
Until recently only a handful of designated historic districts existed,
and those few were usually areas that had been well-known and
much-visited even before their formal recognition as historic districts.
In 1931, Charleston, South Carolina, became the first city to zone an
historic district. New Orleans's Vieux Carr6 followed a few years
later and was in turn followed by San Antonio's La Villita.139 In the
1940s and 1950s these pioneers were joined by several others, includ-
earlier statutes and judicial opinions, where legislatures and courts were especially attentive
to constitutional objections to "merely aesthetic" regulation; the promotion of tourism un-
doubtedly appeared to give a more hard-headed foundation for regulation.
137. See J. Silverstone, supra note 132, at 3; STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON HISTORIC
PRESERVATION AND COINAGE, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS., PRESERVATION PROGRAMS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE
AREA OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 69 (Comm. Print 1976).
138. Revisions to Historic Preservation Tax Incentives Considered by Interior, [1979] 6 Hous. &
DEv. REP. (BNA) 973. These districts are estimated to contain between 750,000 and
1,000,000 historic structures. Id Estimates of the number of historic districts vary, however.
The 1900 figure may well have been derived from a calculation of 10% of the then-current
number of National Register listings (19,000); within a single recent symposium on historic
preservation in Urban Lawyer, the authors came up with several figures, although not all neces-
sarily inconsistent: 1500, Fowler, Historic Preservation and the Law Today, 12 URB. LAW. 3, 4
(1980) (estimated National Register districts); 600, Gilbert, An Overview of the Law of Historic
Preservation, 12 URB. LAw. 13, 13 (1980) (cities and towns with local landmark and/or district
ordinances); and "over 500," Hershman, supra note 125, at 27 (municipal landmark or his-
toric district ordinances).
139. J. MORRISON, supra note 3, at 17, 133-34. In 1924 New Orleans passed, but never
carried into effect, an ordinance to protect the French Quarter; the first effective protection of
the Quarter came with New Orleans, La., Ordinance 14,538 (Mar. 3, 1937), following an
amendment to Louisiana's constitution that specifically authorized the creation of the Vieux
Carr6 historic district. LA. CONST. OF 1921, art. XIV, § 22A (1936); see J. MORRISON, supra
note 3, at 17 n. 11; Forman, Historic Preservation and Urban Development Law in Louisiana, 21 LA.
BJ. 197 (1974). Louisiana's current constitution authorizes local governments generally to
create historic districts. LA. CONST. OF 1974, art. VI, § 17.
The San Antonio, Tex., Ordinance 01-355 (Oct. 12, 1939), is summarized in J. MORRI-
SON, supra note 3, at 168-69.
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ing districts in Alexandria, Virginia;140 Winston-Salem, North Caro-
lina;1 4 1 Washington, D.C. (Georgetown); t42  Santa Fe, New
Mexico;143 Lexington, Kentucky; 44 Annapolis, Maryland; 45 and
Nantucket and Boston (Beacon Hill) in Massachusetts. 4 ' Although
some were to act as protective buffers around specific landmarks,
47
historic districts generally tried to evoke a past era by preserving the
area itself; a quarter built in a particular style was to form an "out-
door museum" in some ways comparable to the highly touted Wil-
liamsburg. 1
48
The leading cities in historic district legislation were usually vaca-
tion areas that, as one commentator put it, wished "to capitalize on
local color."'149 Their district legislation was designed to protect the
tourist trade and to prevent over-commercialization that might kill
the goose that laid the golden egg. 50 An initial concern was merely
to limit the distraction caused by outsized or unsightly signs.'' But
140. Alexandria, Va., Ordinance 470 (Aug. 13, 1946); see J. MORRISON, supra note 3, at
129-30.
141. Winston-Salem, N.C., Zoning Ordinance §§ 13(r), 14 (Dec. 21, 1948), citedin Note,
The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, supra note 51, at 714
n.7 7 .
142. Act Creating "Old Georgetown," Pub. L. No. 81-808, 64 Stat. 903 (1950) (codified
at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-801 to -805 (1973)).
143. Santa Fe, N.M., Ordinance 1957-18 (Oct. 30, 1957); see City of Santa Fe v. Gam-
ble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 412-13, 389 P.2d 13, 15 (1964).
144. Lexington, Ky., Ordinahce 3841 (Nov. 20, 1958); see J. MORRISON, supra note 3, at
145-46.
145. Annapolis, Md., Ordinance Creating Board of Review for Historic Annapolis
(June 9, 1952); see J. MORRISON, supra note 3, at 130.
146. Ch. 601, 1955 Mass. Acts 494 (current version at ch. 395, 1970 Mass. Acts 237)
(Nantucket); ch. 616, 1955 Mass. Acts 513 (Beacon Hill).
147. See, e.g., Springfield, Ill., Ordinance (June 28, 1966) (establishing a protective dis-
trict around Abraham- Lincoln's home). The Springfield ordinance is discussed in M & N
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Springfield, I 11 Ill. App. 2d 444, 250 N.E.2d 289 (1969); Rebman
v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 430, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969).
148. The notion of a district as an "outdoor museum" dates at least from the late nine-
teenth century, with the 1891 opening of "Skansia," a park in Stockholm. This was Artur
Hazelius's display of old buildings-complete with costumed guides-from different regions
of Sweden and from various epochs in European history. See C. HOSMER, supra note 4, at 24.
See also Michelsen, The Outdoor Museum and its Educational Program, in HISTORIC PRESERVA-
TION TODAY, supra note 11, at 201, and particularly the comment thereto by E.P. Alexander,
Vice-President of Colonial Williamsburg, id at 218, 222, comparing historic districts to out-
door museums. Williamsburg and other early historic districts are described in N. WEIN-
BERG, supra note 4, at 36-60.
149. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 126.
150. See, e.g., the description of the motivations for Nantucket's historic district in Note,
Land Use Controls in Historic Areas, 44 NOTRE DAME LAW. 379, 402 (1969).
151. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
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the restrictions also reflected the view that tourists came to see the
older structures as they appeared at the time of their construction.
The rationale of visual protection extended far beyond sign re-
striction to the most detailed regulation of changes in the exterior
features of buildings. Like many current district ordinances, Massa-
chusetts's 1955 legislation for Nantucket's historic district regulated
building shape, color, roof slope, and window and door design. In
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,152 upholding this legislation, the
Massachusetts Supreme Court noted the rationale that tourists
wanted to see the area as it had always looked, taking judicial notice
that Nantucket is one of the very old towns of the Commonwealth;
that for perhaps a century it was a famous seat of the whaling in-
dustry and accumulated wealth and culture which made itself
manifest in some fine examples of early American architecture; and
that the sedate and quaint appearance of the old island town has to
a large extent still remained unspoiled and in all probability consti-
tutes a substantial part of the appeal which has enabled it to build
up its summer vacation business to take the place of its former
means of livelihood ...
It is not difficult to imagine how the erection of a few wholly
incongruous structures might destroy one of the principal assets of
the town.
53
From prohibiting "incongruous" new structures, it was but a
short step to prohibiting owners from demolishing older structures or
even to requiring them to maintain unwanted old properties. Re-
quirements of the latter type were challenged in a recent cause celebre
in New Orleans's French Quarter, Maher v. City of New Orleans. 1
5
Maher sought permission to tear down a Victorian cottage next to
his home in the Quarter. After much litigation, he was not only de-
nied the permit but was also held responsible for minimum mainte-
nance of the odious building. 155 The court said it contributed to the
whole, or, as they say in Louisiana, to "le tout ensemble" 156 -appar-
152. 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
153. Id at 780, 128 N.E.2d at 562.
154. 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 (1976). Maher's extended
administrative appeals and litigation are reviewed in the district court opinion, 371 F. Supp.
653 (E.D. La. 1974).
155. An interesting wrinkle was that the cottage was in fact of a Victorian style. Judi-
cial opinions originally upholding the Vieux Carr6 ordinance had stressed the protection of
buildings dating from the much earlier French and Spanish eras. City of New Orleans v.
Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 858, 5
So. 2d 129, 131 (1941).
156. City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 858, 5 So. 2d 129, 131 (1941).
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ently more so than the proposed replacement, a modern version of an
earlier Spanish style.
Maher's tribulations illustrate an historic district design problem:
What features "contribute" to a district, and why? Some communi-
ties devote little attention to those questions and borrow language
from other ordinances with a certain nonchalance about what should
be preserved in their own district. 57
Legislation typically requires uniformity with whatever is already
built. Many district ordinances follow the Nantucket statute and bar
alterations that are "obviously incongruous" with the surrounding
buildings because of design, arrangement, materials, color, and tex-
ture. 158 In the South and West, many towns "cash in on their 'Latin'
traditions"15 9 by prescribing one or more architectural styles. 160 In
Santa Fe's historic district, new construction must conform to a
"Santa Fe" style described in some detail; 16 1 in Nevada City, Califor-
nia, the appropriate style is "Mother Lode."
'162
Savannah's regulations have made the principle of uniformity a
fine science, assessing proposed construction on the basis of "related-
ness criteria"; a proposed structure wins "points" for design features
that render it like its neighbors in height, roof angle and shape,
materials, color, or "rhythm" of doors and other recessed spaces. 163
Much of Savannah's early restoration activity, including the descrip-
tion of uniform design features and "relatedness criteria," was the
product of an urban renewal project.
Urban renewal initiated a number of other well-known preserva-
tion projects as well, such as Philadelphia's Society Hill and Provi-
dence, Rhode Island's College Hill district." Urban renewal has
not generally been regarded as a friend of historic preservation, and
157. J. Silverstone, supra note 132, at 13-14.
158. Ch. 601, § 8(b)-(c), 1955 Mass. Acts 494 (current version at ch. 395, § 9(b)-(c),
1970 Mass. Acts 237). Many ordinances borrowing this language also add scale as a factor for
consideration. See, e.g., ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE § 16-35006(c)(2).
159. Jacobs, supra note 11, at 127.
160. E.g., SANTA BARBARA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 22.24; see G. GAMMAGE, P.
JONES & S. JONES, supra note 6, at 127.
161. See Santa Fe, N.M., Ordinance 1957-18 (Oct. 30, 1957).
162. Nevada City, Cal., Ordinance 338; see G. GAMMAGE, P. JONES & S. JONES, supra
note 6, at 117.
163. Savannah's plan is described and illustrated in detail in Tondro, An HistoricPreser-
vation Approach to Municpal Rehabilitation of Older Neghborhoods, 8 CONN. L. REV. 248, 267-74,
306-11 (1976). A major document upon which this plan was based is HOUSING AUTHORITY
OF SAVANNAH, HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN FOR THE CENTRAL AREA (1973).
164. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 65, at 22-25,
54-57, 62-63; N. WEINBERG, supra note 4, at 68-77, 95-107.
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it is still a bit unsettling to read a sleek, early-60s-vintage brochure
stating that urban renewal projects restore older sections through
land acquisition and demolition of structures that "interfere" with
"the approved plan" for renewal of the historic area.'65 It is perhaps
more unsettling to read a recent proposal that historic districts now
adopt the old urban renewal techniques of eminent domain and re-
sale to developers (for restoration);' 66 one imagines "selective clear-
ance" of "interfering" buildings whose only sin is that they disturb
the uniformity of the district's design.
The 1950s and early 1960s urban renewal plans for preservation
have a continuing influence in historic district planning. The Urban
Renewal Administration's 1959 College Hill project description was'
prominently cited in an architect's recent plan for preservation in
Rockville, Maryland; 6 7 and Philadelphia's Society Hill project is fre-
quently cited for the use of historic preservation for urban revitaliza-
tion.' 8 Given the strong influence of urban renewal projects on
historic districts, it is no surprise that the districts sometimes share
with urban renewal projects an overplanned quality and an imperi-
ous suppression of variety that may ruin the liveliness and diversity
of an urban neighborhood. I69 Historic district regulation, by nar-
rowing a builder's design choices to a few approved styles, can freeze
a community's architectural character to reflect some quasi-mythic
time in the past, at the cost of creative contributions by current resi-
dents. In Rockville, Maryland's historic district plan, one cannot but
contrast the whimsical decorative freedom of the original nineteenth-
165. U.S. URBAN RENEWAL ADMIN., supra note 65, at 3. The co-sponsored study,
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF SAVANNAH, supra note 163, at 25, also spoke of "selective clear-
ance" to remove "blighting influences, including incompatible signs and unsightly struc-
tures." See Historic Preservation via Urban Renewal, 19 J. HOUSING 297, 299 (1962) (leading
participant in Providence, R.I., preservation activity speaks of Urban Renewal's assistance in,
among other things, removing "blighting influences").
166. Tondro, supra note 163, at 303-05.
167. A. SENKEVrrCH, supra note 82, at 171, citing PROVIDENCE, R.I., CITY PLAN COM-
MISSION, COLLEGE HILL: A DEMONSTRATION STUDY OF HISTORIC AREA RENEWAL (2&ed.
1967) (conducted in cooperation with Providence Preservation Society and U.S. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Development) [hereinafter cited as COLLEGE HILL].
168. See, e.g. , Ziegler, Large-Scale CommercialAdaptive Use: Preservation Revitalizes Old Build-
ings-And New Ones Tool, 11 N.C. CENT. L.J. 234, 235-36 (1980).
169. See J. JACOBS, supra note 69, at 190-97; Dunlop, Perspectives on Philadelphia's Ap-
proach to Planning, AM. INST. ARCHITECTS J., Mar. 1976, at 48. V. SCULLY, supra note 59, at
161-71, relates urban renewal projects to the "Garden City" conception of a "new town" in
which, by contrast to the mixed uses and structure types of older cities, the entire range of
living arrangements were to be allocated according to a single plan or design. R. STERN,
supra note 59, at 80-9 1, points out that within large urban renewal projects, individual devel-
opment parcels were sometimes planned separately, with little relationship to one another.
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century builders with the exacting rigidity of the planners' suggested
guidelines for protecting or recreating those nineteenth-century
choices. 1
70
This drift to design uniformity is ironic, not only because it re-
flects a view of history as stasis, but because it reverses the position
that preservationists have taken in some celebrated battles against
urban renewal projects. Don't Tear It Down, one of Washington's
more litigious preservation groups, got its start by battling the Penn-
sylvania Avenue Development Corporation's plan to remove the idi-
osyncratic old Post Office. In that effort the preservationists argued
for diversity.
171
Of course a communitarian argument for uniformity may be
made-that similarity of design may lend "legibility" to a neighbor-
hood or street, especially when the old buildings promote a sense of
orientation through their familiarity and relationship to each other.
But while uniformity may serve a purpose, there is surely a limit to
its imposition short of the point of visual tedium and creative atro-
phy. 172 The visible elements of the past ought not hem us in, but
should rather invite us to make creative contributions of our own.
173
Some newer thinking on historic preservation attempts to assure
that historic district regulation not stifle newer styles. Historic dis-
trict plans since College Hill have allowed districts to contain a suc-
cession of styles rather than a single one. 174 Newer ordinances such
170. A. SENKEVrrCH, supra note 82, at 51; ROCKVILLE HISTORIC DISTRICT COIMIS-
SION, supra note 82.
171. Don't Tear It Down (1971) (promotional pamphlet of Don't Tear It Down, a citi-
zen's action group). The National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-515, sec. 505, 94 Stat. 2987, now require the Pennsylvania Avenue Development Cor-
poration to identify and preserve "historic values" not already slated for redevelopment.
172. The concern to protect creativity has surfaced several times in connection with
architectural controls outside the context of historic preservation. See Note, Architectural Er-
pressio " Police Power and the First Amendment, supra note 51, at 300-04, and authorities cited
therein.
173. See Murtagh, Comment, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION TODAY, sufira note I1, at 144,
148, observing that the Europeans seem better able to blend their appreciation of newer and
older architectural elements. The architectural historian Vincent Scully, remarking on
Washington's Pennsylvania Avenue redevelopment plan, said: "I prefer a little junk to a
pompous stage set. .. . What we need here is a dialog between the old buildings and the
new. A little mess is like fluid, both of decay and healing-full of ideas, excitement and
promise." Von Eckardt, Leave the Avenue As Is, Architect Ask, reprinted in Pensylvania Ave.
Commin." Hearings on S. Res. 116 before the Subcomm. on Parks and Recreation of the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Afairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1966).
174. See, e.g., A. SENKEVrrCH, su/ra note 82, at 170-77; COLLEGE HILL, supra note 167,
at 73 etpassim. A downtown restoration official in Coming, N.Y., epitomized the contempo-
rary view in saying, "The most important thing to remember.., is that we are not trying to
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as Exeter, New Hampshire's provide that new buildings in the his-
toric district may have a modern design so long as the result "harmo-
nizes" with nearby older buildings.'75 But the proviso begs the
question of what it means to "harmonize," or taken negatively, as in
the Nantucket statute, what it means to be "obviously incongruous"
with the character of the district. These questions are unintelligible
without reference to some theory of the way in which architecture,
old and new, contributes to the community.
Without a theory, the tendency is to favor mere conformity. Al-
though many newer ordinances and studies allow room for architec-
tural innovation, other regulations are depressingly prim about
flamboyance or modernity. In the venerable district ordinance of
Charleston, South Carolina, a structure's "inappropriateness" may
arise from "[a]rresting and spectacular effects, violent contrasts of
materials or colors and intense or lurid colors, a multiplicity or incon-
gruity of details resulting in a restless and disturbing appearance, [or]
the absence of unity and coherence in composition not in consonance
with the dignity and character of the present structure. . . or with
the prevailing character of the neighborhood." 176 Chillicothe, Ohio's
more recent ordinance includes explicit warnings: "Attention shall
be taken to avoid the environmentally harmful effect often created
by the clash of undisguised contemporary materials with those of
older origin, such as aluminum or other metals, plastic, fiberglass and
glass improperly used with brick, stone, masonry and wood."' I7 7 In
Park City, Utah, once a mining town and now a ski resort area, the
preservation commission compares proposed changes in the district
with an illustrated set of design criteria based on local nineteenth-
century building practices. The criteria describe in detail approved
vertical designs, pitched roofs, and natural materials, informing pro-
create a Disneyland of cute recreations of somebody's concept of the past. We are just trying
to design new storefronts that respect the design of the original buildings-hence some mod-
em designs were included." R. WARNER, S. GROFF & R.P. WARNER, Supra note 19, at 178.
175. Exeter, N.H., Amendment to Zoning Ordinance, art. 6.72-1(e)(1) (1980). This is
an interesting and slightly idiosyncratic ordinance; the provision cited goes on to admonish
the would-be builder to "harmonize" any project "with nearby properties of the same nature,
ie., commercial buildings should harmonize with the scale of adjacent commercial buildings,
not that of important public buildings, like the Town Hall." Id
176. Charleston, S.C., Ordinance 1966-12, § 3 (Aug. 16, 1966), as amenddby Charleston,
S.C., Ordinance 1973-11, § 2 (Apr. 10, 1973) (current version at CHARLEsTON, S.C., CITY
CODE § 54-31(9)). An almost verbatim provision appears in ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE § 16-
35006(c)(8). However fitting these strictures may be for preserving Charleston's eighteenth-
century areas, one must wonder at their use by Atlanta, which is a much newer city whose
earliest structures have been "gone with the wind" since the great Civil War fire.
177. CHILLICOTHE, OHIO, PLANNING AND ZONING CODE § 1197.13(b) (1977).
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spective builders that "Swiss Chalet" or "A-frame" buildings will be
"discouraged" and that the deplored aluminum siding is "unaccept-
able."
' 178
Such directives undoubtedly encourage pleasant open brickwork
and the little boutiques and eating spots that seem to fit so well; they
may even produce substantial tourist revenues-while the fad lasts.
But they can also produce structures whose efforts to match the sur-
roundings result in the kind of neo-Colonial house in Edgartown that
Charles Moore described as "bearing about as much resemblance to
the older houses as Little Orphan Annie, with her round and empty
eyes, does to real people.
179
Moreover, tastes may change. The promotion of tourism may
provide no long-term protection for a neighborhood's older struc-
tures. The city that is seriously pursuing tourist dollars will turn an
historic district into Disneyland if that is what brings crowds.
Even more important, while historic district designation can be a
point of pride to a neighborhood, requirements of design uniformity
can subtly inhibit the district as a community. Designation can pro-
hibit newer elements that might lend focus and comfort to the area,
and can stifle the process of change and imaginative reuse that is,
after all, also an important part of a community's historic develop-
ment.
Dz~li'cls and displacement. Another motive that leads cities to desig-
nate historic districts is attracting taxpaying businesses and middle-
class residents to the city. Historic preservation, and especially his-
toric district designation, is widely perceived-whether correctly or
not-as a lever for "revitalization." ' 0 Cities hope that historic dis-
trict designation of a decaying residential or commercial area will
call attention to the underlying quality of the structures of the area.
A district's architectural controls also assure commercial developers
and middle-class buyer-rehabilitators that further construction in the
area will follow strictly limited restoration patterns. Such certainty,
cities hope, will raise property values and property taxes and en-
courage surrounding areas to follow the example of rehabilitation
and revitalization.
1 8 1
178. PARK CITY, UTAH, CODE §§ 2.7, 2.7.5 (1976).
179. C. MOORE, THE PLACE OF HOUSES 16 (1974).
180. E.g., U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE CONTRIBU-
TION OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACTIVITIES TO URBAN REVITALIZATION 1 (1979).
181. See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 48, at 3; R.
MONTAGUE & T. WRENN, PLANNING FOR PRESERVATION, 8-13 (1964); Canty, Philadelphia in
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It is only recently that historic districts have been viewed as po-
tential contributors to urban revitalization. Whether or not these
hopes are well-founded, they are a major force behind the bur-
geoning numbers of local districts created in the past ten years. The
revitalization motive, even more than the tourism motive, links his-
toric preservation with urban renewal.' 8 2 It is not surprising, then,
that revitalization through historic districting raises another urban
renewal specter-the disruption of low-income families and neigh-
borhoods. 83
In urban renewal projects, such disruption was most visible and
most serious in what Vincent Scully called the "cataclysmic"
projects, where whole neighborhoods were leveled and the tenants
turned out.'84 But clearance projects were not the only source of dis-
ruption. Even rehabilitation projects under urban renewal caused
dislocation because of subsequent rent increases that low-income resi-
dents could not pay.'85
Historic districting without careful attention to communitarian
concerns threatens a similar dislocation, particularly given the reha-
bilitation incentives of the 1976 Tax Reform Act.' 86 Historic dis-
tricts, like urban renewal target zones, are frequently older
residential areas that consist of Victorian houses occupied by low-
income or ethnic minority residents.187 Low-income interest associa-
tions such as the National Urban Coalition'88 fear that rehabilitation
the Years Since its LocalRenaissance, AM. INST. ARCHrrEcTs J., Mar. 1976, at 31; Dean, Adaptive
Use: Economic and Other Benedots, id, June 1976, at 26; Gold, supra note 131, at 357-58.
182. See, e.g., R. MONTAGUE &T. WRENN, supra note 181, at 11; T. Bever, supra note 19,
at 1,6.
183. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND COINAGE,
supra note 137, at 62-63; Newsome, supra note 35; J. Mollenkopf, Neighborhood Political
Development and the Politics of Urban Growth: Boston and San Francisco 1958-1978, at 3
(1978) (paper prepared for 1978 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Ass'n,
New York, N.Y.).
184. V. SCULLY, supra note 59, at 245-52 (describing disruption of low-income area in
urban renewal program in New Haven, Conn.); see Fried, Grievingfor a Lost Home: Pychological
Costs of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL, THE RECORD AND THE CONTROVERSY, supra note 65,
at 359 (describing consequences of urban renewal in Boston's West End).
185. Gergen, Renewal in the Ghetto: A Study of Residential Rehabilitation in Boston's Washing-
ton Park, 3 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 243, 293-300 (1968).
186. 26 U.S.C. §§ 48, 167, 191, 280B (1976).
187. See, e.g., COLLEGE HILL, supra note 167. This was the plan for an urban renewal
project to conserve the historic area in Providence, Rhode Island. In this plan, the blocks
slated for clearance contained a noticeably high number of Victorian structures in low-rental
areas. Seeid at 97, 100, 117 (maps).
188. Repeal ofHistoric Preservation Tax Incentives Urged by Urban Coalition, [ 1978] 5 Hous. &
DEV. REP. (BNA) 844; see Canty, supra note 181, at 43; Dunlop, supra note 169, at 48; Rod-
dewig & Young, Neighborhood Revitalization and the Historic Preservation Incentives of the Tax Reform
February 1981]
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in historic districts, leading to steep rent increases, will force low-in-
come tenants to leave their old neighborhoods, without even the ben-
efit of the Uniform Relocation Act payments that once assisted those
displaced by urban renewal projects and other governmental acquisi-
tions. 8 9 Low-income homeowners may not be injured economically
by any rise in property values that accompanies the revitalization
and "gentrification" of a neighborhood, but they too may neverthe-
-less gradually depart the area, whether from irresistible offers from
new buyers, from inability to pay for code enforcement repairs and
higher property taxes, or from normal patterns of death and migra-
tion.' 90 Their egress means a gradual social shift that can transform
familiar low-income neighborhoods into someone else's "turf."
Preservationists are understandably sensitive about displacement,
and many deny that historic districting by itself forces out low-in-
come residents. They argue that historic districting is a result rather
than a cause of middle-class interest in older neighborhoods. Dis-
placement, they say, has more to do with housing market conditions
than with the designation of historic districts.' While this argu-
ment may be correct, it is an uneasy companion to another preserva-
tionist argument that landmark and district designation enhances
the value of structures by calling attention to them and protecting
their aesthetic qualities. 192 In any event, the tax benefits for rehabili-
tation in historic districts 9 3 add marginally to property values and
Act of 1976" Lessonsfrom the Bottom Line of a Chicago Red Brick Three-Flat, 11 URB. LAv. 51, 72
(1979). The recent report, NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEIGHBORHOODS, PEOPLE, BUILDING
NEIGHBORHOODS 55 (1979), considered the low-income displacement problem and recom-
mended that National Register designations of historic districts be accompanied by impact
statements and that neighborhood disruption be alleviated by special grants and technical
assistance. Federal preservation officials have shown some of the same concerns in connection
with tax benefits in historic districts; in the introductory remarks to the regulations concern-
ing certification of state and local districts for rehabilitation tax benefits, state and local offi-
cials were urged to evaluate the "social implications" of district upgrading and to assure that
"residents are provided for, as appropriate." 42 Fed. Reg. 40,437 (1977).
189. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1976). While concerned about low-income resident dis-
placement, HUD does not favor relocation benefits for those displaced by private revitaliza-
tion. See Displacement Potential to be Considered in All HUD Funding Decisions, [ 1979] 7 Hous. &
DEV. REP. (BNA) 541.
190. See R. MONTAGUE & T. WRENN, supra note 181, at 13.
191. Id; Interview with Nellie Longsworth, supra note 119; Interview with Judith Sobel,
supra note 85; see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEIGHBORHOODS, supra note 188, at 290.
192. See, e.g., M & N Enterprises, Inc., v. City of Springfield, 111 111. App. 2d 444,
450-51, 250 N.E.2d 289, 293 (1969); R. MONTAGUE & T. WRENN, supra note 181, at 8-14.
193. When such a neighborhood appears on the National Register, or when it is pro-
tected by a state or local statute that sufficiently preserves its historic character, the Tax
Reform Act gives owners of historically significant depreciable properties substantial tax ben-
efits for rehabilitation. See I.R.C. § 191. A 1978 amendment to the 1976 provisions requires
[Vol. 33:473
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thus to long-term displacement pressures on low-income residents of
eligible historic districts. 94 The same may be said of other programs
that fund historic preservation in older neighborhoods.1 95 "Revitali-
zation" through preservation may only serve to fragment low-income
communities.
To be sure, any displacement caused by historic preservation is
gradual by comparison with a typical urban renewal or freeway pro-
ject. But the frequency with which the displacement issue arises
should suggest an underlying doubt about historic districts, since an
ostensible purpose of preservation programs is to foster community
ties rather than disrupt them.
Some localities have addressed the problem through programs to
aid low-income residents of historic districts or areas. Savannah uses
federal "section 8" housing assistance to subsidize low-income renters
in the city's historic areas. 96 San Francisco, Seattle, and other cities
have used general revenue sharing or community development allo-
that the locally protected historic district, to be certified, must itself meet "substantially all of
the requirements for listing districts in the National Register." Id § 191(d)(2)(B)(ii). With
this amendment, it is presumably impossible for a local government to designate a spurious
"historic district" merely for the purpose of securing tax benefits for commercial rehabilita-
tion in the area.
194. HERITAGE CONSERVATION AND RECREATION SERVICE, supra note 29, at 7, 26-27
(report on the effects of the 1976 Tax Reform Act), minimizes the displacement effects, noting
that many of the properties certified for tax benefits involve rehabilitations that add resi-
dences to the housing stock. This does not, however, speak directly to the problem of long-
term low-income displacement due to increases in property values, taxes, and rents. More
directly relevant is the report's point that some of the rehabilitation projects have included
housing subsidies for low-income tenants. Id. On subsidy programs of this kind, see text
accompanying notes 196-99 infia.
195. For example, low-income spokesmen are understandably wary when local govern-
ments channel federal community development block grant funds, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5301-5317
(1976), into historic preservation. See, e.g., R. BROWN, WITH A. COIL & C. ROSE, A TIME
FOR ACCOUNTING: THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT IN THE SOUTH
62-68 (1976). Some elements of HUD have shown similar concern. See, e.g., Community Devd-
oment Brie/s, f 1977] 5 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 316 (finding of the local HUD field office
and of the Region V office that Milwaukee's proposed rehabilitation of the Pabst mansion
was inappropriate for community development funding, in that the plan neither aided low-
and moderate-income persons nor aided in the prevention of slums and blight). A HUD
memo of Nov. 6, 1978 concerning the eligibility of preservation activities for community de-
velopment funds also shows HUD efforts to target local preservation activities to low- and
moderate-income residents or blighted areas. HUD Encourages, Clarqes Use of CD Funds for
Historic Preservation, [1978] 6 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 604.
196. U.S. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 180, at C-16;
McMillan, Staying Home in Savannah, HISTORIC PRESERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 1980, at 10, 15-17;
State of Maine, Savannah, Ca. Receive CD Innovative Grants, [1978] 5 HOUS. & DEv. REP. (BNA)
1302. For a description of Pasadena's use of the section 8 program, see Pasadena Commission
He/ps Renewal f~rt, supra note 35; see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEIGHBORHOODS, sufra
note 188, at 290 (mixture of HUD programs in a St. Louis preservation area described).
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cations to establish revolving funds for low-interest rehabilitation
loans available to low-income owners of historic properties.1 97 The
Department of the Interior gave out a challenge grant to establish a
revolving loan and grant fund in the historic district in Anacostia,
Maryland, a low-income area near Washington.' 98 Federal preserva-
tion officials have been particularly solicitous of neighborhood organ-
ization and low-income assistance in recent historic preservation
grants to the states, stressing these goals in assessing state preserva-
tion plans.1 99
If preservation is viewed as a communitarian program, this gov-
ernmental concern is entirely appropriate. Assistance to low-income
residents can arrest or at least palliate the disruption that may occur
with historic district designation and "gentrification" and can at the
same time preserve the best aspects of historic district designation:
increased pride in community, education, and the discovery of
"roots. ' 200 A concern for community suggests, however, that historic
district designation and control should spring at least in part from
the initiative of those who have the greatest contact with the district,
a matter to which I shall return when considering some of the proce-
dural aspects of historic preservation law.
Displacement problems are sometimes conjoined with design is-
sues in historic districts. Anacostia, Maryland, is emerging as a show-
case for an historic district project in a low-income neighborhood.
197. Galbreath, supra note 17, at 317-22. For descriptions of programs in other cities,
see Cambridge Commission Making Grants up to 52000 to Assist Rehabilitation of Building Exteriors,
Landmark & Historic District Commissions, Oct. 1977, at 1, col. I (Nat'l Trust for Historic
Preservation newsletter) (Cambridge, Mass.); Cambridge Plans Grants to Help Owners Retain Ar-
chitectural Details During Rehabilitation, id, Feb. 1976, at 3, col. 1 (Cambridge, Mass.); Memphis
Landmarks Commission Helps Restoration Work by Residents of Low-Income Victorian Area, id, June
1978, at 1, col. 1 (Memphis, Tenn.); Racine Board Gets Community Development Funds, id, June
1976, at 3, col. 2, and at 4, col. 1 (Racine, Wis.).
198. Interior Awards Over SI Million to 10 Innovative Historic Preservation Projects, [1979] 6
Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 1145.
199. Interior Dept. Launches New SI Million Historic Preservation E ort for States, [1978] 6
Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 257; Planning Div., Heritage Conservation and Recreation Serv-
ice, Dep't of Interior, Description of F.Y. 1979 Preservation Fund Priorities, Manual 185
(unpublished manual for use in reports to Congress).
200. Preservationists sometimes cite the activities of Lowell, Massachusetts, to illustrate
that preservation need not be a blue-blood activity but can also relate to a quest for ethnic
and working-class history, including, in this case, feminist history. Interview with Nellie
Longsworth, supra note 119. Portions of this old planned industrial city have now become a
national historical park and preservation district. 16 U.S.C. §§ 410cc to 410cc-35 (Supp. III
1979). See Report Recommends District Designation to Save Ethnic Character of Neighborhood in Provi-
dence, Landmark & Historic District Commissions, Oct. 1976, at 3, col. 2 (Nat'l Trust for
Historic Preservation newsletter) (similar concern for the preservation and revitalization of an
old immigrant neighborhood in Providence, R.I.).
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But the studies preliminary to its historic designation suggest the
manner in which uniform historic design criteria, meant to revitalize
a low-income area, can ignore the wishes of current residents. Resi-
dents' responses to an initial survey indicated concern about housing
costs and the general neatness of houses and buildings in Anacostia.
The architecture student surveyors, though, seemed to care most
about the original character of the Victorian cottages. They devised
a set of intricately detailed guidelines for "correct" rehabilitation:
"yes" to round-cut shingles, "no" to wide-slat siding and picture win-
dows.2 1 A resident worried about cleanliness and a good coat of
paint may find those directives tangential indeed. He may resent the
suggestion that his planned installation of aluminum siding and a
plate glass window will detract from the character of the neighbor-
hood. 2  He may especially resist the idea that to make any improve-
ment at all, he must use more expensive materials and designs.
Many resident resentments can be assuaged through subsidy pro-
grams and through the process of talking things over. Historic dis-
trict designation and regulation, like landmark designation, should
educate about the qualities that make an area definable and livable.
The landmark analogy is apt in another way as well. The larger
community treats an historic district as an exploitable resource that
gives visual definition and depth to the community at large and that
may draw tourists andinvestors. But the larger community's defini-
tion of the district's desirable features may conflict with the area's
self-tefinition, and designating an area as an historic district may
disrupt existing relations among neighbors. If landmark regulation
threatens to pit the larger community against an individual owner,
then district regulation may pit the larger community against the
smaller. Thus, accommodation between these communities becomes
crucially important. This suggests the central importance of proce-
dure in preservation law.
B. Preservation Procedures and Community Accommodation
Historic preservation cannot help build community unless the
201. SCHOOL OF ARCHITECTURE, UNIV. OF MD., DESIGN GUIDE FOR THE EXTERIOR
REHABILITATION OF BUILDINGS IN OLD ANACOSTIA 42-72 (1975); SCHOOL OF ARCHITEC-
TURE, UNIV. OF MD., OLD ANACOSTIA: A STUDY OF COMMUNITY PRESERVATION 86-109
(1975).
202. The study feared an "insensitive alteration" or an "additional intrusion" that is
incompatible with "the established visual quality of the environment." See SCHOOL OF AR-
CHITECTURE, UNIV. OF MD., OLD ANACOSTIA: A STUDY OF COMMUNITY PRESERVATION
45-57 (1975).
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major questions of procedure-which groups should have a voice in
preservation decisions, and how they should participate-are given
proper consideration. This section explores the roles of experts and
community groups on historic preservation boards and examines the
newer review-and-comment procedures affecting government
projects.
1. The procedures of architectural control.
Historic preservation procedures for architectural control attempt
to bring professional judgment to bear on the disposition of historic
properties and areas. Through preservation ordinances, the architec-
tural review board and its professional architects, historians, arche-
ologists, and art specialists dominate permit procedures for
landmarks and historic district properties.2 °3
Although the presence of professionals lends an aura of technical
neutrality to preservation decisions, that appearance is illusory. Pres-
ervation decisions, even when made by professionals, are steeped in
politics. First, the physical surroundings may have a political impact
in themselves, and hence decisions about preserving structures neces-
sarily carry political consequences for the community. More imme-
diately, public decisions about preservation entail choices and
compromise among constituencies, and despite the considerable def-
erence to professional artistic and historical judgment, the review
process often aims at the political goals of neighborhood self-govern-
203. See, e.g., Act Establishing the Boston Landmarks Commission, ch. 772, § 3, 1975
Mass. Acts 1023; ALEXANDRIA, VA., CODE, art. XIV, § 42-89 (1963); NATIONAL TRUST FOR
HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 97, at 20. Some ordinances, however, do not provide
for expert membership. See note 212 infa.
The expertise of the board may be a factor in upholding architectural controls that are
otherwise subject to the attack of arbitrariness. See, e.g., South of Second Assocs. v. Ge-
orgetown, 190 Colo. 89, 91 n.1, 580 P.2d 807, 808 n.1 (1978), where the court noted disap-
provingly that the ordinance in question no longer required professional members. In
Tacoma, Washington, dilution of the requirements for architectural and historical experts on
the local review board has been a source of concern for local preservationists. Some of the
correspondence about this matter is on file at the Heritage Conservation and Recreation
Service's Tax Certification office.
The National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94
Stat. 2987, will undoubtedly pressure localities to use professionals on preservation review
commissions. This legislation provides that 10% of federal preservation grants to the states
are to be passed on to localities that have state-certified preservation programs. Id sec.
201(a), § 101(b)-(c) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)-(c)); id sec. 203(b) (to be codified
at 16 U.S.C. § 470c(c)-(d)). The local programs are to include review commissions that have
professional members when available in the community. Id sec. 501, § 301(13)(A) (to be
codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470w(13)(A)).
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ment as well as accommodation between the neighborhood and the
larger community.
The politics of professional review boards. The composition of some
architectural committees is inescapably political. Serving along with
the generalists are members who are, in some instances, the nominees
of professional organizations such as the American Institute of Archi-
tects;2° 4 many ordinances also explicitly provide positions for devel-
opers and real estate specialists. 20 5 Thus, a professional member may
also be the voice of an organized constituency, a representative of
those whose conduct is to be regulated. Representation of developers
and builders is undoubtedly intended to facilitate compromise be-
tween the needs of new development and preservation. But the pos-
sibility of conflict of interest is serious; indeed, Atlanta's preservation
ordinance provides a specific procedure to cope with such conflicts.
20 6
Aside from personal conflicts of interest, the history of urban re-
newal suggests that architects, businessmen, and central city govern-
ments have sometimes been too ready to sacrifice neighborhoods for
grandiose development schemes.20 7 Professional members can no
doubt make an important contribution to preservation boards. But
professional members should not eclipse the views of merely "inter-
ested" members of the community. Judgments about the physical
environment are too multifaceted to be settled by technical expertise.
Moreover, community members have a certain expertise of their
own: Their familiarity with the area breeds a sense of what makes it
"legible," distinct, and exciting. They also know the competing com-
munity needs. Professionals alone may have too narrow a view of
community values, yet, because of technical knowledge and organi-
zational skills, they may be able to dominate preservation boards.
Under some local ordinances, neighbors can challenge the board's
204. E.g., ATL.ANTA, GA., CITY CODE §§ 6-4042 to -4043 (Supp. 1978); Wichita, Kan.,
Ordinance 33-790 (Apr. 1, 1975) (amending WICHITA, KAN., CODE § 2.12.1015). Charleston,
S.C., Ordinance 1966-12, § 3 (Aug. 16, 1966) provided for similar organizational affiliation
until repealed by Charleston, S.C., Ordinance 1979-29, § 1 (Apr. 10, 1979) (current version at
CHARLESTON, S.C., CITY CODE § 54-26), which provides that the City Council is to appoint
at architect, an engineer, and a realtor to the review board, and may also consider recommen-
dations from "cultural organizations."
205. E.g., Act Establishing the Boston Landmarks Commission, ch. 772, § 3, 1975 Mass.
Acts 1023; Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 106348, § 2.01(a) (Apr. 4, 1977).
206. ATLANTA, GA., CITY CODE § 6-4045 (Supp. 1978) provides that the members of
the review board may contract with the city for ordinary business purposes, but not for mat-
ters relating to the Historic Atlanta District; nor may members review work in which they or
their firms have an interest.
207. See, e.g., C. STONE, supra note 68, at 176.
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decision before a body more amenable to their complaints. In New
Orleans's Vieux Carr6, appeals go to the city council;20 1 in Nantuck-
et, to the city's Board of Selectmen;209 in Loudoun County, Virginia,
to the County Board of Supervisors;2 0 and in Washington, D.C., the
architectural review committee is only advisory to the mayor, whose
decision is final. While these ordinances permit a decision by the
architectural review board's experts, they contemplate review of that
decision by a political body without particular expertise.21 2
Political review allows a district community to air its views. In
Maher v. Cip of New Orleans,213 for example, the architectural review
commission granted Maher's application to demolish his cottage, but
the Vieux Carr6 property owners helped to persuade the Council to
reverse that grant.2 4 The case illustrates how even a relatively tech-
nical decision-a demolition permit for a single cottage--can be
politicized. In Maher, the beneficiaries were the neighborhood resi-
dents and property owners who wanted to halt Maher's plans, but
they had to frame their arguments in a way that would convince the
representatives of the entire city.
2 1 5
208. NEw ORLEANS, LA., CODE § 65-10 (1956). This provision is discussed at length in
Maher v. City of New Orleans, 256 La. 131, 235 So. 2d 402 (1970).
209. Ch. 395, § 11, 1970 Mass. Acts 237. Butsee the judicial interpretation of this meas-
ure, note 215 infra.
210. LOUDOUN CO., VA., CODE § 750.16 (1978).
211. Washington, D.C., Law 2-144, § 4(c) (Dec. 27, 1978).
212. Even the architectural board's "expertise" may be doubtful. Most review boards
have at least some slots for merely "interested citizens," and in smaller communities, where
artistic and historical experts are not so readily available as they may be in larger cities, the
ordinance may take the course of Colusa, Cal., Ordinance 293, § 34.02 (Sept. 30, 1975) and
say nothing about expertise of board members. However, new federal grant programs inder
the National Historical Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat.
2987, will undoubtedly lead many communities to attempt to provide for experts when they
can. See note 203 supra.
213. 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974), aftd, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 905 (1976).
214. Id at 656; see note 154 supra and accompanying text.
215. In administrative law, such a decision might well be viewed as regarding a "judi-
cial" rather than a "legislative" fact; the allocation of such a decision to a local legislature
suggests the degree to which historic preservation is a matter for community discussion and
accommodation rather than technical expertise. Another New Orleans case, Tucker v. City
Council, 343 So. 2d 396 (La. App. 1977), raised this point. The city council reversed the city
preservation commission when the latter body refused to permit the razing of some century-
old structures for the construction of a church parking lot. In contesting the city council's
action, the plaintiff argued that the council should be confined to considering whether the
preservation commission acted on the basis of appropriate evidence. The Louisiana court
disagreed, pointing out that, unlike the preservation board, the council had other considera-
tions beyond the aesthetic value and distinction of the buildings (here the safety of the church
service participants, who had apparently suffered beatings and robberies in the past). 343 So.
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Political bodies of generalists can also review the experts' original
designations of historic landmarks and districts. While architectural
preservation boards usually make the initial surveys for landmarks
and districts, their findings frequently serve only as recommendations
to city councils or planning commissions. Although landmarks may
in some places be designated by the architectural board, with an ap-
peal to a planning commission or city council,216 historic districts are
most often created by council ordinance or occasionally by statute.
They are often treated as zoning ordinances and must pass through
the same series of hearings and political decisions that zoning laws
undergo.217
The role of neighborhood control. The residents of an historic district
should play a special role in district control. Indeed, many district
ordinances provide at least informally for resident initiation of the
historic district designation. In Colusa, California, for example, over
half the property owners in the district must subscribe to an historic
district application; 218 and in Washington, D.C., a recognized preser-
vation group or a neighborhood association can make an historic dis-
trict nomination by submitting evidence that "a substantial number
of its members reside or own property in the proposed Historic Dis-
trict. ' ' 2t 9 Moreover, local ordinances often require architectural con-
2d at 398. But see Gumley v. Board of Selectmen, 371 Mass. 718, 724, 358 N.E.2d 1011, 1015
(1977), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court restricted the Nantucket Board of
Selectmen's review powers over the local Historic District Commission to the issue whether
the Commission's decision was "'based on a legally untenable ground, or is unreasonable,
whimsical, capricious or arbitrary.'" (quoting MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals, 356 Mass.
635, 639, 255 N.E.2d 347, 350 (1970)). It is not clear what nonpreservation considerations the
Board of Selectmen may take into account in considering the "reasonableness" of a preserva-
tion commission's decision.
216. See, e.g., New Orleans, La., Ordinance 5992, §§ IX.A(1), XIV.A (Feb. 19, 1976)
(appeal to city council); NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0 (1976)
(Commission decision subject to Board of Estimate veto). In Seattle, each landmark is cre-
ated by council ordinance. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 106348, § 11.01 (Apr. 4, 1977); see, e.g.,
Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 107613 (Aug. 24, 1978) (designating the Thompson/LaTurner
House as a landmark).
217. This pattern may be traceable to the first successful historic district, that of
Charleston, South Carolina, where the district was established via zoning. See, e.g., LOUDOUN
CO., VA., CODE §§ 750.5-.6 (1978). In this ordinance, as in many others, historic district
designation is treated as "overlay" zoning, adding to existing zoning requirements. Id
§ 750.4; accord, WICHITA, KAN., CODE § 2.12.1018). See note 102 su/nra for creation of districts
by state statute.
218. Colusa, Cal., Ordinance 293, § 34.04(e) (Sept. 30, 1975). Elkhart, Ind., Ordinance
2784 (Mar. 18, 1975) (amending Zoning Ordinance for the City of Elkhart § 21.3), also pro-
vides that, among others, the owners of 51% of a district's property may nominate the district
for historic designation.
219. Joint Committee on Landmarks of the National Capital, Procedures for the
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trol boards to include residents of the regulated district.220
Seattle's historic districts show a mix of arrangements for neigh-
borhood control and autonomy. Rather than vesting architectural
control in a single city-wide board, each of the three older districts
has its own board. The boards' compositions differ, but each in-
cludes representatives from among the district's own property own-
ers, residents, and businessmen.2 2' Seattle's newest district
ordinance, for Columbia City, does place authority for architectural
control in the central city-wide Landmarks Preservation Board, but
"[i]n order. . . to maintain adequate community involvement and
contact," two Board members work with a district neighborhood as-
sociation to review proposed construction and make recommenda-
tions to the full Board.22 2 For Seattle, Pike Place Market, which was
created by initiative petition when urban renewal threatened the old
market area,223 is the most autonomous district; unlike the other dis-
tricts, its board makes architectural control decisions rather than rec-
ommendations to a central city authority.
224
Historic districts like Seattle's Pike Place Market may cure what
observers see as a decline in neighborhood influence in city politics
due to the decline of ward politics and the advent of "good govern-
ment" measures for city-wide elections.225 Some commentators feel
that the centralization of the urban governing process left neighbor-
Designation of Historic Landmarks and Historic Districts, § 410.30 (July 22, 1976). See also
Guidelines, supra note 41, at 43, which suggests that the preliminary investigation for a poten-
tial district be assisted by a study committee that includes experts in history, architecture, and
other fields, but which also, "where possible," has these members selected from among resi-
dents of the proposed district itself.
220. See, e.g., Charleston, S.C., Ordinance 1979-29, § 1 (Apr. 10, 1979) (current version
at CHARLESTON, S.C., CITY CODE § 54-26).
221. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 105462, § 4 (Apr. 5, 1976) (Ballard Avenue Landmark
District); Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 100475, § 3 (Dec. 1, 1971) (Pike Place Market District);
Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 98852, § 2 (Apr. 17, 1970), as amended b, Seattle, Wash., Ordinance
103393, § 2 (May 29, 1974) (Pioneer Square Historic District).
222. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 107679, § 5 (Sept. 25, 1978). The city's preservation
staff apparently would like to manage all future districts in this more centralized way. Inter-
view with staff member, Seattle Dep't of Urban Conservation, supra note 115.
223. V. STEINBRUECK, SEATTLE CITYSCAPE #2, at 40 (1973); Interview with staff
member, Seattle Dep't of Urban Conservation, supra note 115. The district was created by
Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 100475, § 2 (Dec. 1, 1971).
224. Seattle, Wash., Ordinance 100475, § 6 (Dec. 1, 1971).
225. See C. STONE, supra note 68, at 168, 213; Lefcoe, supra note 99, at 835. H. GANS,
supra note 78, at 170, 264-65, 298, also argued that residents of low-income neighborhoods
are likely to have few skills in formal organization, and therefore they are likely to be particu-
larly weak in larger-scale politics. See also Dixon, Rebuilding the Urban Political System: Some
Heresies Concerning Citizen Partipat'on, Community Action, Metros, and One Man-One Vote, 58 GEO.
L.J. 955, 963-66 (1970).
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hoods-particularly older and poorer neighborhoods-helpless to
prevent destruction caused by centrally mandated clearance pro-
grams. Historic district status can restore leverage to a neighbor-
hood, at least insofar as the designation-and the procedures
accompanying the designation---enable a neighborhood to control its
own physical environment.226
Self-government through historic district legislation may have its
own problems, however. The first is the potential discord among the
district residents themselves. A district created by referendum, for
example, might be the result of attempts by middle-class entrants to
drive out their lower-income neighbors. Where the district board
represents too many local businesses and too few tenants, its actions
are likewise suspect.
Perhaps even more serious, self-government in an historic preser-
vation district can be insensitive to the needs of the larger commu-
nity. A local district board might claim to be preserving its own
physical environment in avoiding nursing homes, integrated housing
projects, or any change whatever.227 Some warhorse historic district
cases suggest a conscious attempt to prevent low-cost housing.228 The
last-minute creation of an historic district recently prevented a new
226. Montgomery & Gellen, Emerging Issues in American Housing Policy, in A DECENT
HOME AND ENVIRONMENT 168-69 (D. Phares ed. 1977). The very process of organizing a
district may bring a neighborhood together. In that archetype of the American city, Peoria,
Illinois, a member of the historic preservation board remarked that "[h]istorical zoning seems
to have an ability to unify and strengthen the neighborhood by bringing together those peo-
ple who appreciate the unique and attractive aspects of their neighborhood. Some of the
people on Randolph and Roanoke streets did not know one another prior to their battle for
historic zoning." He went on to remark that such people were a "resource" in preserving
inner-city areas: "These are the people who know first hand what a livable city is." Peoria
Commissioner Analyzes Start of Program, Landmark & Historic District Commissions, Oct. 1976,
at 1, col. 1 (Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation newsletter).
227. In Mendocino, California, for example, review board members are to be electors or
property owners in the district, with no other stated qualifications, MENDOCINO Co., CAL.,
ZONING CODE, art. 42, § 20-114 (enacted 1973); and although the standards by which they
judge construction incorporate a book of photos of pre-1900 structures with whose designs
new structures are to "be in general accord," id § 20-119, some local residents think that the
preservation controls in the old town are being used simply to halt development, rather than
to assure the compatibility of new development with the old. Interview with member of local
bar, in Mendocino, Cal. (Sept. 1, 1979). For a similar type of problem, see the delegation
issue presented in Washington ex rel Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928), where
the Supreme Court invalidated that portion of a local zoning ordinance that conditioned the
construction of a children's or old people's home on the consent of neighboring property
owners.
228. See, e.g., Town of Deering ex re. Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 482-83,
202 A.2d 232, 233-34 (1964) (banning of a "pre-built home" on the ground that its design
and location "were such as to impair the atmosphere of the town").
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development in one portion of Denver. 229 One can only guess the
uses that proponents of exclusionary zoning might find for historic
district organization.
It may be that historic district self-government-available in
large part only to older neighborhoods--can alleviate the power im-
balance of older neighborhoods against newer areas. But not even
strong neighborhood proponents suggest that neighborhoods should
be autonomous; rather, local residents should have the means to alert
central urban institutions to neighborhood interests so that city au-
thorities can weigh competing interests. 230 Under this theory, a local
historic district's self-governing machinery might best aim at inform-
ing and educating by airing divergent opinions about specific aspects
of the physical environment in order to arrive at reasoned conclu-
sions about the community value of existing structures and proposed
architectural changes.231
In the final analysis, an historic district exists because it acts as a
landmark to the larger community. The balancing problem is, on
the one hand, to prevent the larger community from exploiting the
district neighborhood and, on the other hand, to prevent the district
neighborhood from arrogating special privileges to itself at the ex-
pense of the larger community's needs.
The best way across this tightrope follows Seattle's management
of Columbia City-delegation of much district management to the
neighborhood itself, allowing the neighborhood to advise and delay,
but not to halt, a project.232 The ultimate decision is best left to the
greater community's political institutions, subject to pressure from
neighborhood publicity and educational efforts.
2. Review-and-comment procedures.
Recent historic preservation legislation has included a procedural
innovation usually associated with the environmental movement: re-
view and comment for federally supported projects. In the historic
preservation context, review and comment have functioned chiefly to
strengthen local community organization.
Development offederal review-and-comment procedures. In the past, fed-
229. Kronholz, Denver's Inner City Enjoys a Resurgence, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1979, at 40,
col. 1.
230. See, e.g., Lefcoe, supra note 99, at 834, 843.
231. See note 226 supra.
232. See notes 221-26 supra and accompanying text.
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eral grants to cities helped to relieve city governments of fiscal depen-
dence on local constituencies and hence enabled them to resist
neighborhood pressures.233 Since the mid-1960s, however, federal re-
view-and-comment legislation 34 has given neighborhood preserva-
tionists a second chance to bring pressure to bear where federal funds
are involved in a local project. For neighborhood and civic preserva-
tionist groups, the federal review-and-comment procedures can serve
functions analogous to those of historic district legislation: Civic
groups get a forum in which to stave off disruptive projects and get
additional time for self-education, organization, and accommodation
between civic or neighborhood groups and the larger community.
The federal highway program was the first to institute preserva-
tion review proceedings. The Department of Transportation Act of
1966 attempts to shield historic properties along with natural and
scenic areas in the path of proposed highway projects. It requires
self-review by federal transportation agencies, including a survey of
potential damage to historically significant properties, and, in the
event of unavoidable adverse effects, adoption of "all possible plan-
ning" to minimize the harm.235
233. The insulation of city governments from neighborhood pressure was certainly a
problem with earlier urban renewal programs. L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM
HousiNG 153 (1968). Despite statutory obeisances to citizen participation, it may be a prob-
lem as well for successor programs such as general revenue sharing, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1264
(1976); see C. Rose, Citizen Participation in Revenue Sharing: A Report from the South, in
Proposed Extension of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act: Hearings on HA 6558 and Related
Bills Before the Subcomm. on Intergovermental Relations and Hunan Resources of the House Comm. on
Governmient Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 628 (1975), community development, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5301-5317 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and Urban Development Action Grants, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5318-5319 (Supp. III 1979).
For the contemporaneous decline of neighborhood influence in local politics, see authori-
ties cited at note 225 supra. For the difficulties that local citizens encountered in challenging
urban renewal through litigation, see McGee, Urban Renewal in the Crucible ofJudicialReview, 56
VA. L. REv. 826, 845-56 (1970). These difficulties, clustering chiefly about restrictive rulings
on standing, dissipated to some degree in the late 1960s, when some charges of racial discrimi-
nation were leveled successfully at renewal projects. Id at 858-94.
234. An excellent summary of the federal review-and-comment legislation in this area,
along with the major problems that have emerged to date, may be found in Comment, Federal
Historic Presevation Law: Uneven Standards for Our Nation's Heritage, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
189 (1980). This comment, of course, predates the National Historic Preservation Act
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987.
235. Department of Transportation Act of i966, § 4(1), 49 U.S.C. § 1653( (1976). In
1968 this section's language was incorporated into the Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1976),
and similar review-and-comment requirements appear in the Urban Mass Transportation
Assistance Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1610 (1976). In addition to § 4() self-review, transporta-
tion projects are reviewable by the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation under the
NHPA. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976).
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The National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA),236 also passed
in 1966, is a wide-ranging review-and-comment statute which re-
quires, before approval of funds for any federally assisted project, a
search for any National Register properties237 that might be ad-
versely affected. If such properties exist, the program agency must
submit the project to review and comment by the NHPA-created
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.238
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)219 in-
cludes historic elements among the aspects of the environment to be
protected in federal plans and programs; 24 ° federal agencies must
prepare environmental impact statements for historic properties af-
fected by major federal actions. Since any agency preparing an envi-
ronmental impact statement must secure the comments of other
agencies with special expertise about any environmental impact,
NEPA creates another potential review-and-comment role for the
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation.24'
The next step came in 1971, when Executive Order 11,593 re-
quired that federal agencies consult the Advisory Council to develop
procedures to assure historic preservation in their program activi-
ties.242 Under the authority of the NHPA and the executive order,
the Advisory Council adopted its own regulations in 1974, establish-
ing a unified review process for projects subject to both NEPA and
236. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976), as amended by National Historic Preservation Act
Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987.
237. The 1976 amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
422, 90 Stat. 1320 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976)), extend these review-and-comment
requirements to properties eligible for inclusion on the National Register. For the litigation
background, see note 244 infra.
The recent National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515,
sec. 201(a), § 101(a)(6), 94 Stat. 2987 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(6)), provide that
an owner may block Register listing. The owner may not block a determination of Register
elgibility, however, so review-and-comment procedures continue to protect even those eligible
properties that are kept off the Register by owner objection. Id The amendments also clarify
federal agency duties to identify and preserve historic properties within their control. Id see.
206 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2).
238. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976). The Council comments on the adverse effects and possi-
ble means of mitigation.
239. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
240. Id § 4331(b)(4).
241. Id § 4332(2)(C). The old regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality
specifically listed the Advisory Council as among the agencies whose comments must be solic-
ited when their area of expertise is relevant. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.9 & app. 11 (1978), repealed, 43
Fed. Reg. 55,990 (1978). The new regulations still permit a broad role for the Advisory Coun-
cil, but they put more of a burden on it to step forward and assert its interests. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.6 (1980).
242. 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (1971), reprinted in 16 U.S.C. § 470 app. at 429 (1976).
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NHPA.243 These regulations have caused a flurry of litigation be-
cause they give the Advisory Council a role in a variety of federally
supported projects whose participants resent the Council's pres-
ence.
244
243. 39 Fed. Reg. 3366-67 (1974) (§ 800.2) (current version at 36 C.F.R. § 800.9
(1980)).
244. The most difficult litigation controversies over the regulations have typically arisen
in the context of some uncompleted urban renewal project dating from the 1960s; the project
typically called for demolition of some property that had historic interest, but that was placed
on the National Register of Historic Places only after the basic funding arrangements had
been made between the federal agency and the local renewal authority. In the usual case,
some irate local group spearheaded the National Register nomination in order to halt the
renewal activity. The Advisory Council's 1974 regulations raised two related problems. The
first concerned the categories of properties that are to be protected by Advisory Council re-
view, and the second concerned the nature of the federal agency activity that triggers review.
The Council's 1974 regulations required that programs affecting properties merely eligi-
ble for the National Register (as well as properties already on the Register) be subject to
Advisory Council review. The NHPA's language did not include merely eligible properties
until the 1976 amendments, and several courts ruled that the statute gave the Advisory Coun-
cil no review powers over merely eligible properties. See, e.g., Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v.
Harris, 460 F. Supp. 1120 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F.
Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); St. Joseph Historical Soc'y v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth.,
366 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Mo. 1973). Some of these cases, however, sustained some role for the
Advisory Council, or at least some further administrative review. In some of these, the courts
took the view that the federal program agency, in connection with its own Executive Order
11,593 duties, had "adopted" the Advisory Council's review procedures. See, e.g., Save the
Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Other courts took
the view that aside from the NHPA, NEPA applies to historic properties whether or not they
are actually listed on the National Register, and thus some environmental impact statement
had to be prepared in connection with projects that affect merely eligible properties. See, e.g.,
Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 460 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D. Wis. 1978). But see St.
Joseph Historical Soc'y v. Land Clearance for Redev. Auth., 366 F. Supp. 605, 612 (W.D.
Mo. 1973), which confined NEPA review to properties actually on the Register.
As to the second and related problem, the type of agency activity that necessitates re-
view, the Advisory Council's regulations have also taken a more expansive view than have
some courts. In the NHPA's language, Advisory Council review is triggered by "approval of
the expenditure of any federal funds on the undertaking" that affects a National Register
property (now including eligible properties). 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976). This language seems to
allow a more sweeping interpretation than NEPA's trigger for an environmental impact state-
ment ("major Federal actions," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976)). The key lies in the definition
of "undertaking," and while the Advisory Council's regulations defined "undertaking" to in-
clude each stage of a continuing project, 36 C.F.R. § 80 0 .2(c) (1980), some courts have inter-
preted "undertaking" more narrowly: Focusing on the "approval of the expenditure"
language, 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976), they have said that review applies only at the initial fund-
ing decision on a project as a whole. Thus, the reasoning goes, if no National Register proper-
ties were affected at the time of the initial funding decision, then the NHPA does not require
review, even though later stages of the project may affect Register properties belatedly nomi-
nated. NEPA, on the other hand, because of the "continuing responsibility" language of
§ 4331(b), has been viewed as requiring revised impact statement review for the later stages of
continuing projects. See, e.g., Hart v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir.
1977); Wisconsin Heritages, Inc. v. Harris, 460 F. Supp. 1120, 1125-26 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Save
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Not surprisingly, the main targets of federal review procedures
have been highway and urban renewal projects. Local citizen groups
have used the review-and-comment statutes to delay or redirect of-
fending projects by insisting on Advisory Council review or agency
preparation of an environmental impact statement. The preserva-
tion groups have run into technical litigation problems at times, but
even where NHPA review has failed, the groups have frequently suc-
ceeded in imposing at least the delay required to prepare a NEPA
environmental statement. 45
Preservation groups must also face the bureaucratic resistance im-
plicitly acknowledged in the very passage of review-and-comment
statutes: Governmental agencies may only grudgingly pause to con-
sider the preservation impact of their projects.2 6 In several cases,
one glimpses this basic indifference or even antagonism to preserva-
tion.
Fund-shifting gimmickry in highway cases is one example. All
federal review procedures are predicated on some federal participa-
tion in a project, but in several highway cases, litigation was required
to overturn the program agencies' transparent attempts to escape re-
view through avoiding the appearance of federal participation. In
Thompson v. Fugate,247 for example, federal interstate highway funds
were awarded to help Virginia construct every segment of a highway
encircling Richmond--except the one segment that barreled through
a venerable eighteenth-century mansion once owned by Thomas Jef-
ferson's family.
2 48
the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408 F. Supp. 1323, 1340-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Jones
v. Lynn, 477 F.2d 885 (lst Cir. 1973) (NEPA); Boston Waterfront Resident Ass'n v. Romney,
343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972) (NEPA). The effect of such decisions has been to restrict the
applicability of the NHPA, particularly in the context of older projects, even where an impact
statement revision may be required under NEPA. This restrictive interpretation of NHPA
review has recently been rejected by the Second Circuit in WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310
(2d Cir. 1979), where the court.iaund no reason to hold that NHPA review should be more
limited than NEPA review. See also Comment, supra note 234, at 210.
245. See note 244 supra.
246. Henderson & Pearson, Implementing Federal Environmental Policies: The Limits of As-
pirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1429 (1978), is an interesting commentary on the
difficulties of review-and-comment legislation; it focuses particularly on the problem of "ap-
propriating" the expertise of program agencies for some goal in which they are uninterested.
Provocative though the article is, in this author's view it gives insufficient weight to the oppor-
tunities that review-and-comment legislation opens up for public interest and community
groups, who often can develop a high level of expertise of their own and who in addition may
be particularly interested in the opportunities that review-and-comment presents for delay,
publicity, and persuasion about publicly supported projects. See id., at 1461.
247. 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
248. The mansion was the Tuckahoe Plantation, which had been the home of Thomas
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A similar fund-shifting device, again involving Virginia, was con-
tested in Ely v. Velde.249 Local residents of a rural historic area at-
tempted to enjoin construction of a prisoner reception center funded
through an unrestricted block grant by the federal Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration. 5 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied NEPA and NHPA review requirements to the project even
though the block grant formula is designed to minimize federal inter-
vention. But the court imposed no review requirements on the recip-
ient state government,25 I and the district court implied on remand
that Virginia could avoid review by shifting its Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration funds to a different project and placing
what were ostensibly state funds in the prison project.252
Jefferson's mother. A similar instance of highway segmentation occurred in a case followed
by the Fugate court, Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v.
Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). As in
Fugate, the project was subjected to environmental review despite the segmentation. While
Gray, The Response of Federal Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 314
(1971), argues that transportation programs were sensitized relatively early to historic preser-
vation concerns-at least by comparison with other programs, notably those in housing and
urban development-some of the Advisory Council staff members disagree. They view fed-
eral transportation programs as particularly "captive" to state interests and particularly apt
to defer if the state agencies are indifferent to preservation. Interview with staff member,
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Dep't of the Interior, in Washington, D.C. (July
29, 1979).
249. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
250. The Administration was the creation of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3796 (1976).
251. 451 F.2d at 1139.
252. Ely v. Velde, 363 F. Supp. 277 (E.D. Va. 1973). The district court ruled that the
plaintiffs had to undertake the exceedingly arduous task of tracing the substituted funds back
to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration grant-that is, they would have to show
that without the grant funds for other projects, the state would have expended its state funds
on those other projects rather than on the prison center. Id at 283. The case more broadly
suggests that the evasion of preservation review can be a special problem in projects funded
under decentralized federal block grant allocations to states or localities, since the possibilities
for fund-shifting and the difficulties of tracing are particularly great with such allocations.
See ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 48, at 46-47. Some review
provisions can be written into the block grant statutes, however. See, e.g., the Community
Development Block Grant program, where the statute provides that HUD may delegate to
localities the NEPA review responsibility for projects funded through the allocations. 42
U.S.C. § 5304(h) (1976). Conflicts of interest could be particularly sharp for the local grant
recipients, however. Preservationists have recently challenged delegation of review responsi-
bility to the city in connection with an Urban Development Action Grant in Charleston,
South Carolina. See Historic Preservation Groups Fight UDAG Development in Charleston, SC,
[1980] 7 Hous. & DEv. REP. (BNA) 923.
"Privatization devices" are also used by government agencies: Grant-spending opera-
tions run federal funds through such a series of organizational pretzel turns that the project
appears to be a private operation rather than a federal undertaking. See Weintraub v. Rural
Electrification Admin., 457 F. Supp. 78 (M.D. Pa. 1978); for a federal regulation (as com-
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The resistance or indifference of government agencies to preserva-
tion appears even in the designation process for the National Register
through which historically significant places become eligible for fed-
eral review-and-comment protection. The Advisory Council insists
that the designation process should be professional, leaving political
considerations to the later review-and-comment proceedings.253 But
in practice, politics visibly affect the state participation central to Na-
tional Register listings.
State participation in the federal review-and-comment process. Under the
NHPA, the National Register is to include not only nationally signif-
icant properties, but also properties of state and local historic signifi-
cance. In administering the Act, however, state historic preservation
officers and their staffs have assumed a position of critical importance
in designating all Register properties. These state officers (known in
preservation circles by the unlovely acronym of SHPOs) directly
nominate many of the properties and places that are considered for-
and generally accepted by-the Register.254 They also participate in
the Register nominations made by federal program agencies. These
program agencies must identify properties eligible for the Register
before they fund construction of a project and must consult with the
state officer as they make the survey.255
The state officers, then, are key figures in the nomination of
properties that ultimately appear on the Register. But these officers
can be pressured by other state officials and may be understandably
timid about nominating properties where National Register designa-
tion could delay a much-desired civic auditorium or highway.5 6
pared to a federal "undertaking") see Edwards v. First Bank of Dundee, 534 F.2d 1242 (7th
Cir. 1976).
253. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 48, at 18.
254. Until the passage of the 1980 amendments, state historical preservation officer du-
ties were established by regulation. The current versions of the regulations related to state
officer duties in the nomination of properties are at 36 C.F.R. §§ 1202.12(b)-(c), 1202.15
(1980). The 1980 amendments introduce a list of statutory duties for state historical preserva-
tion officers. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515,
sec. 201(a), § 101(b)(3), 94 Stat. 2987 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)(3)).
255. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.4, 1201.8 (1980); note 254 supra.
256. Interview with staff member, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Dep't of
the Interior, in Washington, D.C. (July 24, 1979). The staff member thought, for example,
that the state historical preservation officer in one state was intimidated by the director of the
state's transportation department, who had much better political connections. See ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 48, at 28; Gantz, The Federalism of American
Historic Preservation, in HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN WEST GERMANY AND THE UNITED
STATES 15 (1977); Kellogg, Role of State and Local Laws and Programs in Historic Preserzation, 12
URB. LAW. 31, 39 (1980).
[Vol. 33:473
HeinOnline -- 33 Stan. L. Rev. 530 1980-1981
HISTORIC PRESER VA TION
Moreover, despite federal regulations requiring professional
boards and staff in the state offices and federal insistence that state
offices submit elaborate preservation plans,257 state preservation pro-
grams vary considerably in quality. 258 The 1980 amendments to the
NHPA continue to prod the states to establish professionally staffed
boards,259 but these programs will continue to depend on the budget-
ary decisions of state legislators, some of whom bridle at the expense
of funding federally imposed professionals. State officials also have
an eye on electoral politics and in the past have apparently preferred
that federal historic preservation grants be used for showy "brick-
and-mortar" preservation projects instead of drab surveys. 260 It is
not surprising that in some states the designation process maintains a
certain ad hoc quality.
The importance of citizen groups in the designation process. Given the
vagaries of the state designation process, civic groups are doubly im-
portant in the review-and-comment process. They often take the first
step leading to National Register nomination and designation by
identifying to state preservation officers the significance of particular
sites. Second, these same civic groups are virtually the only bodies
that use the courts to enforce preservation review when federal, state,
and local program agencies all seek to avoid review.2"'
Private litigation is especially important since the Advisory Coun-
cil cannot bring lawsuits on its own behalf. And federal preservation
review is by no means self-enforcing against hostile governmental
agencies. In some instances, neither a federal agency nor a state pres-
ervation office nominates a threatened site. The federal program
agency may think the site insignificant, and the state historical officer
may be unaware of the threat or unwilling to protect the site by nom-
ination. In extreme circumstances the Secretary of the Interior can
257. 36 C.F.R. § 1201.7 (1980); see Planning Div., Heritage Conservation and Recrea-
tion Service, .ura note 199.
258. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 48, at 13-15; Gantz,
supra note 256, at 14 (detailing a conflict between the federal preservation bureaucracy and
the state of Indiana when the Indiana legislature refused to fund more than one professional
preservation staff member); Interview with staff member, Planning Div., Heritage Conserva-
tion and Recreation Service, in Washington, D.C. (July 19, 1979).
259. See note 203 supra.
260. The National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515,
sce. 202(a), 94 Stat. 2987 (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. 470b(a)(3)), attempt to overcome this
tendency by raising federal grants to state surveys to 70% of cost (as compared to 50% for
other state preservation activities). Id at sec. 202(a).
261. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, supra note 48, at 60; Interview
with staff member, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra note 256.
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decide on his own that an area is eligible for National Register list-
ing, even absent a federal agency submission or state officer determi-
nation.262 But those rare instances highlight how the entire review
process depends on the alertness of local groups whose preservation
interests may run contrary to the decisions of their own local govern-
ments.
In short, interested citizen groups are the ones who bring threats
of destruction to the attention of the state historic preservation officer
or the Advisory Council or the federal preservation bureaucracy.
Where one or another of these bodies does not place the property on
the Register, the civic group may still litigate to enforce some sort of
preservation review. Where the matter does come before the Advi-
sory Council for review, citizen group pressures and complaints are
vitally important to bolster the Advisory Council and provide an al-
ternative viewpoint against the program agencies whose main inter-
est is to get the project underway, whatever the preservation
effects.
263
In the final analysis, then, federal preservation review depends on
civic and neighborhood organizations. Despite the complications of
the statutory authority and its accompanying bureaucracy, federal
review-and-comment legislation is essentially a delaying and educa-
tional device for the benefit of those civic and neighborhood groups.
It is by no means contrary to the community-building view of
preservation that these local groups seem at times to act for motives
other than pure interest in history and aesthetics. Litigation records
are replete with cases of eleventh-hour designations of historic signifi-
cance and National Register eligibility. These cases give the impres-
sion that neighborhood citizens were oblivious to the historic
significance of the old county courthouse, 264 Greek Revival and
Richardsonian Romanesque main street storefronts, 265 or ancient
262. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(3) (1980); see Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.
1976).
263. Interview with staff member, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, supra note
256. The staff member noted that the Advisory Council must rely on outside sources of infor-
mation, and at times the only means by which the Council learns of destructive projects is
through the direct communication of civic groups. See also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC
PRESERVATION, sura note 48, at 61.
264. Save Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 99
(N.D. Ga. 1976), afd, 576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978); Save the Courthouse Comm. v. Lynn, 408
F. Supp. 1323 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
265. WATCH v. Harris, 603 F.2d 310, 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (commenting briefly on the
phenomenon of the eleventh-hour Register designation). See also Hall County Historical
Soc'y, Inc. v. Georgia Dep't of Transp., 447 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
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shrines266 until they had exhausted all other means of avoiding the
inroads of government projects in their neighborhoods.
Some of this delay may be due to ignorance of review devices.
Some may represent the time it takes for the proposed demolition to
awaken the community to its own attachment to a building or an
area. But suppose that the neighborhood citizens only think belat-
edly of historic or aesthetic significance and are in fact using historic
preservation review as a makeweight to avoid a project destructive to
the neighborhood. The impurity of motive is less important if one
views historic preservation as essentially a community-building pro-
cess, involving community discussion and self-education about the
best means by which to protect a physical environment in which
neighbors can feel at home. Age, representativeness of style, associa-
tion with past events, and even aesthetic quality are only some of the
many factors that contribute to a physical environment that draws
members of a community together. If the historic preservation re-
view statutes help citizens identify the features that they value in
their communities, they perform a useful educational function.
Preservation review-and-comment procedures, like local architec-
tural control ordinances, sometimes only delay a decision adverse to
the stated concerns of the neighborhood. Delay, of course, has its
costs, 267 but it also serves to bring the developers and the preserva-
tionists into contact so that they may refine and publicize public pur-
poses at stake in a project, weigh considerations of the physical
environment against competing social goals, and perhaps devise an
accommodation.
III. CONCLUSION
A major public purpose underlying modern preservation law is
the fostering of community cohesion, and ultimately, the encourage-
ment of pluralism. Preservation law encourages a physical environ-
ment that supports community; it also provides procedures that can
themselves organize a community, both by focusing the members'
attention on aspects of the physical environment that can make them
266. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1976); Aluli v. Brown, 437 F.
Supp. 602 (D. Hawaii 1977), reov, 602 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1979); Environmental Defense Fund
v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), afd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.
1974).
267. See Marles, supra note 132. In the case of a delay in a governmental project, how-
ever, the costs of delay may be spread through the public.
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feel at home and by defining a smaller community's contribution to a
larger.
Modern historic preservation law is communitarian in both the
substantive and the procedural senses. The most important substan-
tive contribution of preservation law has been recognition of the po-
litical aspect of our physical surroundings-especially the older
features of those surroundings-and the consideration of which kinds
of physical environment are appropriate to a nation of democratic
communities. Perhaps the chief danger accompanying this recogni-
tion is the possibility of dogmatism-and dogmatism in matters of
expression is something of which we should be especially wary. That
danger alone makes it vital that preservation decisions be the prod-
uct of a wide range of views.
Proper procedures help ensure the availability of those views.
The most important procedural contribution of preservation law has
been the provision of focal points for neighborhood and civic organi-
zation and education. These opportunities for community influence
have value not only because a neighborhood is especially able to as-
sess the worth of its own streets and structures, but because discussion
itself can strengthen the neighborhood, encourage self-definition, and
give leverage with the larger community. The dangers of community
influence are those so familiar in land use generally: No one wants
the highway, the prison, or the housing project. In short, local
groups may pay too little attention to the needs of the larger commu-
nity.
In practice, both local architectural ordinances and federal re-
view legislation must grapple with the issue of who should make final
decisions. Perhaps just as important as the point "where the buck
stops," however, is the route that the buck takes. A route through
neighborhood and community groups is in keeping with preserva-
tion's emerging communitarian purpose. Such a route substantially
aids the ultimate decisionmaker and helps to strengthen pluralistic
government. The potential demolition of a venerable building or
the alteration of a portion of an historic district becomes the occasion
on which elements of a whole range of interest groups-developers,
neighborhood, city, state, and nation--consider and debate the phys-
ical elements that bind communities together and link present com-
munities to the past and to the future. This, I suggest, is the way that
modern preservation law serves the public well-being.
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